Version 1.2

Prepared for the Tokyo Conference & Manza Retreat

September 19-21,1997

Beyond the New Guidelines


Akira Ogawa
Executive Director & Chief Researcher


Better Than Nothing

The new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA] and the Defense Agency under the big environmental changes surrounding Japan are just "better than nothing." In 1984, Japan completed its crisis study under Article 5 of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and showed the US what roles to play in case of an emergency. While extending the study to include a crisis on the Korean Peninsula under Article 6, Japan entered the post-Cold War era and had to leave the study unfinished because the completion of the crisis study in the Middle East and its effects on Japan were more in demand due to intensified US-USSR confrontation. The new Guidelines are challenging the indispensable subject for national strategy making which was interrupted years ago. What kind of discussions should be held in the future? That is the topic of this paper.

Two Crises of War

There have been two crises on the Korean Peninsula. The first was during the Miyazawa Cabinet, and the second was during the Hosokawa and Hata Cabinets. Both verged on becoming wars. The first crisis in 1993 occurred when North Korea [NK] declared its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] because the US had captured information on NK's nuclear development and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] demanded nuclear inspection. Though some hard-liners in the US called for preemptive attacks on nuclear facilities in NK, the US did not follow their advice and NK took back its withdrawal. The Japanese felt that the crisis had been avoided somehow.

The second crisis came in the spring of 1994 when the IAEA announced that NK had rejected the important principle of nuclear inspection. NK again declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The US maintained that the money used for NK's nuclear development came from Japan, and asked for economic sanctions and blockades against NK. The Japanese government rapidly began preparations to meet American demands, but discontinued their efforts when President Jimmy Carter ended the crisis in his meeting with NK's President Kim Il-Sung. Although the situation on the Peninsula now looks quiet due to the US policy of appeasement, the sources of the crises are not gone.

Just Like Training on a Hill

Japanese officials were really scared during 1993 and 1994 since they were exposed to the possibility of war not once, but twice. If one of those crises had led to a war, none of the crisis systems in Japan would have worked in time. Nonetheless, Japan resembled a marathon athlete whose lung capacity has quickly improved after interval training on a hill. Recalling past events, a DA official said, "So many times, luckily (Japan) suddenly found a plateau and was relieved when (it) climbed up on a steep slope. As a result, Japan's crisis management system improved drastically."

Proactive and Extensive Discussion

The US issued the Bottom-up Review in September 1993, which largely changed American strategy through such bald decisions as reducing troops from 2.2 million at the end of the Cold War to 1.4 million. Also released were the "Nuclear System Review" (in September 1994) and the "East Asia Strategic Report [EASR]" (in February 1995) in which the US announced that it would maintain the US-Japan security system. Prior to the EASR, American security specialists like Dr. Joseph Nye, Dr. Ezra Vogel, and Dr. Patrick Cronin visited Japan following the spring of 1994 in order to exchange opinions with Japanese officials in the MOFA and DA. A DA official said, "The US side preferred proactive and extensive discussion, seeking a stable framework in the region as a whole, to reactive discussion on an imminent crisis on the Korean Peninsula."

In August of 1994, the 5th year since the end of the Cold War, the Advisory Group on Defense Issues published its proposal. The new Defense Outline released in November 1995 presented the idea of crisis management in the neighboring area, which led to the new Guidelines.

The Real Goal is in Fukuoka

A Joint US-Japan Security Declaration was originally to be announced in 1995 after studying Japan's strategic review and the American East Asia Strategic Report (the so called Nye Initiative). Due to the cancellation of President Bill Clinton's visit to Japan and the Okinawa rape incident in the fall, the Joint Declaration was released in April 1996.

In the beginning, the Joint Declaration was to propose the establishment of a system with the proactive capability to maintain future stability in the region while treating Japan's Defense Outline, the Guidelines, and the defense of the 1,000 nautical miles of Sea Lanes as one package. The reality was, however, that the imminent crisis on the Korean Peninsula attracted people's attention and discussions on the new Guidelines have been reactive and small-scale. As a result, unfortunately, discussions at the Diet were also held to a low level. Criticizing politicians and the administration, Dietman Motoo Shiina said: "There was a man in Tokyo, who had to go to Fukuoka for business. Without enough money to buy a ticket (to go to Fukuoka), he neglected his duties and lived in Tokyo for decades. Recently, however, he had some money to buy a ticket and went to Okayama. There he said, 'Finally, I've come as far as Okayama! Please say something good about me!' Unless he goes to Fukuoka, he cannot fulfill his duties. It is stupid."

The MOFA and DA have reviewed the small-scale and proactive Guidelines. When the forty items of cooperation in the neighboring area to be considered in the interim report were announced in June, the mass media wrote many articles analyzing each item. The discussion has remained at a very low level -- just like talking about a man's hairstyle when he arrives at Okayama station.

No Specific Scenario

Apparently these forty items did not come from one scenario, since they include a wide range of cases, such as cooperation on economic blockades and war. MOFA and DA officials explained that these items emerged while considering several crisis scenarios on the Korean Peninsula.

A crisis in the neighboring area is not limited only to the Korean Peninsula. However, a DA official said, "In any case, a crisis on the Peninsula is an extensive scenario. Therefore, a crisis on the Peninsula occupied eighty percent of our consideration. Adding several other cases, we narrowed it down to forty items." The Guidelines are not a manual for crisis management. Therefore, it is understandable that there is no one scenario corresponding to each of the forty items.

Stupidity to Limit Their Potential

A problem exists where they considered situations only manageable within the current interpretation of the Constitution and did not discuss situations beyond that scope. It is like a person who can only add, and who therefore only selects mathematics problems requiring addition. Although he/she can solve all the problems, he/she forgets that, in reality, there exist problems which cannot be solved by addition alone. The Japanese learn advanced mathematics. Why did they start thinking in such a shortsighted way that limits their potential?

Unreliable Self Defense Forces are "Planned Out"

US troops in Japan reportedly told the DA: "(Japan) does not have to do anything difficult and dangerous. You can keep sleeping even if your neighbor catches fire, though (we) will use your hydrant." Isn't this too good to be true?

The DA asked, through various routes, US troops in Japan about "what they expect from Japan" in the case of a Korean Peninsula emergency. A DA official said, "US troops expect very little (from us)." There are two reasons for the US' low expectations. First, the US estimates that a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would end within weeks. Therefore, Americans think that they can finish a war without Japan's help.

Second, they are not going to plan for help from a Self Defense Forces [SDF] on which they cannot rely. In other words, the SDF is "planned out." The US "plans in" only a reliable collaborator. Military men tend to "plan out" anyone like Japan who cannot decide what to do before a crisis occurs. A US military official in Japan reportedly told a DA official, "If (you) cannot do something, please say 'No'. If you say 'No', US troops in Japan won't count on you. However, please don't say, 'maybe' as usual. 'Maybe' is a lot worse than 'No'." Military men can talk straight to each other. US soldiers would fight even if Japan does not do anything. Some may say that Japan can show its sincerity by showing up at the battle field. Nonetheless, a modern war is complicated. Nobody can contribute without integrating war-power through joint planning and advance training. If a person runs up to a blazing fire in their pajamas, saying he/she realizes the importance of putting it out, no one recognizes that he/she came to help fight the fire. He/She would be only regarded as a curious onlooker or a thief at a fire.

The Problem Exists in Politics

The core of the problem exists not at the military level but at the political level. What would it mean politically if Japan did nothing while US soldiers died almost everyday on the Korean Peninsula? Although a war might end in a short time, the US might incur heavy casualties. The US lost many soldiers in the guerrilla battles during the Korean War. A former SDF soldier said, "Not being good at guerrilla battles, the US would lose more soldiers (during a future crisis on the Korean Peninsula) than it did during the Gulf War."

Surely, the US Congress and mass media would criticize Japan within twenty-four hours of an outbreak of war on the Peninsula, saying, "The Japanese are not going to shed a drop of blood!" Why doesn't the US criticize Japan now? Dr. James Auer, who used to be in charge of Japan at the Department of Defense, analyzes the situation as follows: "Both Congress and the public do not think about the future because they are stupid and short-sighted. However, once American soldiers start to die, the situation would be totally different. Japan would be exposed to strong criticism. Nobody would listen to Japan when Japan explains to the US that the US had said Japan could keep sleeping even if Japan's neighbor was on fire. Unless Japan sheds blood with the US, neither the Congress nor the public would understand. Wasn't this a lesson from the Gulf War?"

The new Guidelines do not take such political dangers into consideration at all. Of course, fighting together on a battle field is not the only way to become a reliable ally. If you don't want to hold a gun, you can follow the model of American conscientious objectors. If the Japanese volunteer to take responsibility for even more dangerous tasks than fighting on the front-line as soldiers, in addition to accepting medical and transportation tasks, Japan would be respected in the world as a conscientious objector. Selfish Japanese behavior such as saying "(We) don't want to send (our) lovers and sons to the battle fields," would only be interpreted as an expression of egoism, because wives and mothers of American soldiers would respond, "We don't want to send our lovers and sons to the battle fields either. But there is something we have to protect even at the price of our own blood."

Sometimes a Typhoon Drops a Ripe Persimmon

Some say that NK needs no worries from outside because it is like a ripe persimmon. Certainly, it is a role for diplomacy to shake a tree to let ripe persimmons fall and to prepare a basket under the tree. However, sometimes a typhoon blows off a branch before the persimmons drop. It is a soldier's responsibility to prepare for a typhoon. Aren't national leaders, including the mass media, the ones who should worry about a future typhoon even when the ordinary people are enjoying picnicking under a clear autumn blue sky?

On the contrary, recent leaders try not to think of typhoons. It is the clear first step toward national failure, because crises occur suddenly. Did anyone expect the Oil Crisis, the Gulf crisis, or the Peru Incident? Although Japan has been lucky enough to successfully weather many crises, should leaders trust national survival to mere possibilities?

Not Irresponsible from the Constitution's Point of View

In relation to the new Guidelines, it is doubtful if senior officials at the MOFA and DA would try seriously to defend the nation at the cost of their lives. Precisely speaking, the SDF is against the Constitution. Therefore, public officials have not studied security. In a country with such a Constitution, nobody can blame officials for not considering emergencies. This is really weird.

In any case, during the process of the new Guidelines review, don't most officials think of compiling the best thing within the given range? If officials in uniform think the same way as civilians, where is the value of the uniform?

Collective Self Defense Right Issue-Unavoidable

The core reason as to why the new Guidelines review went in the wrong direction is that officials concerned lacked, from the very beginning, the freedom to think experimentally about "what would happen if the constitutional interpretation is changed and the right of collective self defense is recognized." Under such circumstances, who could possibly establish blueprints for national survival?

Even If the Possibility is Under One Percent

There are several scenarios of emergencies on the Korean Peninsula, like a typhoon arriving before ripe persimmons drop. A war on the Peninsula could occur either in the form of an internal collapse or an outside explosion. Though the probability may be less than one percent, Japanese leaders should not divert their attention.

Basic scenarios have already been published and introduced through the Japanese mass media, such as: "Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication" by the RAND Corporation in 1996; "Mission Plan 5027" by US troops in South Korea [SK] which stated for the first time in 1994 a plan to strongly defend against a NK invasion and to conclude the war with the fall of Pyongyang; and "Patterns of Collapse in NK" by US troops in SK in 1996.

Three Scenarios Leading to a War

Dr. Hideshi Takesada of the National Institute for Defense Studies, who is famous for his joint research projects with the RAND Corporation, said that based on the above mentioned studies, there are three possible scenarios leading to war.

First, given the severe economic situation and food crisis, leaders in Pyongyang could decide to invade SK in order to quell internal uneasiness. Under this scenario, NK would use all the weapons they have. This "worst-case" version includes the possibility of chemical weapon war. If SK is in political chaos or SK-US relations are not smooth, damages in SK would be enormous.

Second, NK's economic difficulties, though there is no such visible signal at the moment, invite political insecurity, could lead to confrontation between reformists and conservatives. This scenario predicts that such a confrontation would escalate into a civil war, in which some forces would invade SK.

Third, a final scenario describes a case in which Kim Jong-il would order NK's soldiers or warships to invade beyond the 38th Line, into the Joint Patrol Area, or on the Five Islands in the West Sea in order to either gain leverage for diplomatic purposes or to claim that "there is a war crisis." These actions would lead to a military confrontation between SK and NK, which might be expanded into a large-scale war.

If an extreme case such as the first scenario occurs, there is a possibility that US troops in SK and Japan would be involved in a war after NK's large-scale invasion into SK. In that case, NK might attack US bases in Japan and Japanese cities with ballistic missiles, while terrorists in Japan might use chemical weapons to spread panic and destroy buildings. These items were seriously discussed right after the second crisis in 1994.

The new Guidelines also take them into account

In the second and third cases, NK's surprise attacks by their special commandos would start a war. NK's ground forces would rush into Seoul from several points of attack and surround the capitol city. They would take more than ten million civilians hostage, aiming to bring the war to an end in an honorable cease-fire. NK's war aim would be to "keep the nation."

Controlling the Tsushima Strait is the Key

The US-SK Joint Forces cannot establish rear areas in order to defend SK safely because there are only five hundreds kilometers between South and North on the Peninsula. As a result, the Japanese mainland and Okinawa would be needed as rear and logistic in SK for the safe counter attacks. Controlling the Tsushima Straits is a prerequisite for US-SK Joint Forces' victory, just as it was in the Korean War. If mines placed by NK in the Tsushima Strait are all swept, two US Carrier Task Forces could sail freely to both the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. Entering the Sea of Japan at the same time as Maritime Propositioning Ships rushed from the Mariana Areas, US Marines from Okinawa, together with SK's Marines, could land on the east coast. At that time, mine-sweeping in landing areas would be important. Finally, they could surround and occupy Pyongyang from the East and South. That would be the end of the war.

Where is the Lesson Learned from the Gulf War?

If an emergency arises, the above-mentioned would occur. The direction of ground forces would be almost identical to that of the Korean War. How would Japan act ? The new Guidelines limit Japan's choices. It seems that no lessons were learned from the Gulf War. How far would Japan mobilize its world-class Maritime SDF mine-sweepers? Fifty years ago, the US placed five thousands mines in the Kanmon Strait and interrupted maritime communication between Japan and China. NK could do the same. If Japan declines to undertake mine-sweeping, the US would have to bring in mine-sweepers from the US, despite the cost. During the two weeks it would take for American mine-sweepers to arrive, Japan would have to be prepared for daily criticism from the US mass media. Moreover, Japan would have to pay for the cost of mine-sweeping done by the US later. In addition to not being respected, Japan might be treated as a quasi enemy even if it did cover the costs of mine-sweeping. The problem is a political rather than a military one. That was the lesson from the Gulf War.

Legal Preparation for the New Guidelines Is Optimistic

The new Guidelines are neither a treaty nor an agreement between the US and Japan. Since the MOFA and DA are working on it without consulting other ministries, other ministries can, in theory, ignore it. Nonetheless, the new Guidelines receive cooperation from other ministries more easily than is usually expected because the government is studying contingency planning on its own. That is a good news. The next problem will be linking the New Guidelines of US-Japan Defense Cooperation with the world-wide contingency planning. If Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto instructs each ministry directly at a cabinet meeting, things should go smoothly. By using the existing working group to study crises, it would be easy to overhaul the legal system. Then, it would not be so difficult to present it as a part of a bill during the ordinary Diet session of 1998.

Thus, the legal preparation might be completed during the ordinary Diet session of 1999. After the legal preparation is over, substantial discussions on emergency laws could finally start. Having to make up for decades of post-war negligence in only two years, officials will have enormous amounts to do. Yet, the new Guidelines are only a part of the Defense Outline. If one concentrates only on the Guidelines, he/she would lose the whole picture. Ideally, emergency laws should be the basis for a discussion on how to deal with crises. In reality, however, the opposite is occurring: emergency laws will be dealt with after considering how the government should manage crises. Because one is afraid of fire, he/she installs sprinklers and gets relieved. In this case, however, there is no water pipe running behind the ceiling.

SK -- A New Element

In peacetime, the "threat/prevention" of Cold-War type countermeasures is necessary in order to prevent the outbreak of war by making Japan invincible from NK's attacks. If the US, Japan, and SK work jointly, they could deal with a crisis. In other words, Japan and SK must cooperate closely. Conventional US-Japan cooperation has included a very simple combination of the SDF and US troops in Japan. Now, a new element, SK, must be added. The new Guidelines, however, would not be even enough to ensure firm cooperation between the US and Japan. SK's former Foreign Minister Ro-Myung Gong stated in 1996 that US-Japan cooperation works favorably for SK. Since then, President Kim Yong-sam has expressed openly that the US-Japan Alliance serves as an important function for SK. Now SK's leaders, strategists, and military men can rationally state that reliable Japanese and US Japan Alliances benefit SK. However, strong public emotions and critical media nonetheless remain important problems for SK.

Let's Start by Deepening Discussions among Specialists

During the Guidelines review, most Japanese intellectuals claimed that "Now discussions in the Diet and public discussions are called for." Isn't it time, however, for specialists to deepen their discussions on the subject? Let's create opportunities for discussion with those who have retired from the SDF. They are military specialists. National fate cannot be trusted to laymen or critics who easily agree with the public. Moreover, those specialists must recognize that some things must be protected, even if it is at the cost of young men's blood. Without such firm beliefs, the mass media reports and Diet discussions have no meaning. Isn't it the basic mission of national leaders and the mass media to present values and visions?

Peacetime Senility without Strategic Discussion

Let's talk about the future. It is indispensable to Japan's improvement to correct "peacetime senility" among Japanese intellectuals who have neglected strategic discussion. The year 2005 will be the sixtieth anniversary after the end of the war. In Asia, the sixtieth year has traditionally been an important cornerstone because the number sixty is a multiple of twelve, which represents the signs of the Chinese zodiac. Perhaps the postwar-review at the fiftieth anniversary was not well-accepted by the people because the year was artificially designated against the natural cycle of thinking.

Japan was once defeated and completely lost its sense of national values and strategy. Isn't it a rule of human society that only he/she who loses totally can recover? Japanese history has been locally-oriented since ancient times. Every single Japanese nationalist has contributed to Japan's prosperity, but failed to receive respect from neighboring countries. However, the twenty-first century should be a time when the Japanese contribute positively to regional stability. Then, they will be transformed from a local actor into a regional actor. Some young politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, and scholars who are free from the biased education of the Japan Teachers' Union, have emerged with values and strategy at a world level. The author is very optimistic about Japan in the near future.

Naturally the Taiwan Strait should be Included in US-Japan Cooperation

The new Guidelines will probably last for fifteen to twenty years, because the last one existed for eighteen years. Therefore, it is important to consider what will happen after the problems of the Korean Peninsula are solved. It is natural that US-Japan cooperation in the twenty-first century will include the Taiwan Strait. In order to avoid limiting the potential of the new Guidelines, discussions on whether or not "the neighboring area includes Taiwan" should not be held. Though Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama finished such a stupid discussion, Prime Minister Hashimoto should have clearly stated that before Mr. Kajiyama did.

What characterizes the Taiwan Strait issue is the fact that nobody is sure if China is a threat or not. Therefore, a "shaping & hedging" strategy of the post-Cold war type should be adopted. Some Japanese believe that discussing China as a threat makes China a threat. However, it is necessary to apply a "shaping" strategy to move China from uncertainty into certainty in the international system, including in US engagement policy. Moreover, a "hedging" strategy is called for in order to minimize the dangers of uncertainty.

A US-Japan Alliance can Check China

Neither NK nor China should be made enemies. Nations act based on bargaining. Therefore, if a nation raises an issue, it would be wise to let the nation later withdraw it as if nothing had happened.

China can be held in check if the US and Japan cooperate closely, which would also serve China's interests. Japanese leaders should express this idea clearly to China. By so doing, Japan would be instantly free from problems imposed on Japanese politicians and journalists by China. If China claims that being held in check by the US-Japan Alliance is a threat, all Japan should do is explain to China that checks and provocation are closely related, because international relations are like nations dancing each other. The fact that Japanese politicians, mass media, and the public are not used to such basic discussions on prevention demonstrates a strong need for enlightenment. Specialists' discussion is called for on this point as well.

To Top