THE DAILY YOMURIの最近のブログ記事

INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD / 'Perfidious Columbia'

Hisahiko Okazaki / Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun

 

The way the United States removed North Korea from its terrorism blacklist last month reminds me of the term "perfidious Albion," the expression used to describe the British Empire when it wielded global hegemony in the early 20th century.

 

The term, in my view, refers to the fact that countries with weaker influence sometimes find they have no other choice in dealing with a hegemon but to bite the bullet in the face of the hegemon's conduct.

 

I would like here to look back again on the history of the policy of the U.S. administration of President George W. Bush toward North Korea.

 

The Bush administration's initial policy toward Pyongyang was to brand it as part of an "axis of evil," meaning that Washington would not bother listening to the North. The policy basically meant that the United States was waiting for the North Korean regime to collapse.

 

The U.S. decision in 2002 to scrap the Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang was one of the consequences of that policy.

 

There is a theory, however, that North Korea, having developed the capacity to build nuclear weapons, never had the intention in any way to freeze its nuclear program for long. And it may have decided to acknowledge its uranium-enrichment activities fully aware that doing so might mean that the Agreed Framework would crumble.

 

To ensure the consistency of Bush's policy toward North Korea, it would have been logical for his administration to bolster sanctions against the North to accelerate the demise of the North Korean regime. Even if the envisioned collapse of the regime did not materialize, the Bush administration should have done whatever it could to drive Pyongyang into a corner and extract concessions from it.

 

In fact, the sanctions Japan and the United States jointly implemented against North Korea in the wake of its testing in 2006 of a nuclear weapon with a plutonium core seemed to deal a considerably heavy blow to Pyongyang.

 

What actually occurred, however, was not the demise of North Korea. Pyongyang instead accumulated plutonium by putting the reactor at Yongbyon, north of the capital, into operation again for four years. That eventually led the North to the point where it was capable of carrying out the nuclear test.

 

To put it bluntly, the current U.S. policy, or the policy being advanced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, appears to be designed to return to the status quo ante that was in place at the time of the administration of President Bill Clinton.

 

Given the domestic political circumstances of the United States, however, it is understandably hard for Rice to admit that she is in favor of going back to a policy pursued when the Democratic Party was in power. She therefore uses the rhetoric of asserting that the U.S. negotiations with North Korea this time are different from the past as it is a "step toward the total abolition" of the North's nuclear weapons program. None in the Bush administration, including Rice herself, however, seem to believe in a "total abolition."

 

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Clumsy negotiating strategy

 

 

As a matter of fact, the conditions that have been attached to inspections of the North's nuclear facilities are so lax that the United States has in effect given up the idea of making any further progress on verification of Pyongyang's uranium-enrichment records, nuclear material stockpiles and nuclear weapons.

 

The decision to adopt a policy of returning to where things stood at the time of the Agreed Framework is, in fact, not a bad idea. The problem is the way Rice handled the matter.

 

First, instead of spending a judicious amount of time scrutinizing the effects of the sanctions Japan and the United States imposed on North Korea after its nuclear test, the secretary of state jumped unquestioningly--without consulting Japan--at overtures made by the North, which had its back to the wall.

 

On top of this, the way the United States steered the negotiations over North Korea's denuclearization was extremely inept and clumsy.

 

While the Clinton administration achieved the freezing of the Yongbyon facilities for seven years solely in exchange for offering fuel oil and construction of a light-water reactor to the North, all the Bush administration has obtained, at great cost, is a weasel-worded promise from the North that it will disable its nuclear facilities--which can be recovered in six months or so.

 

In fact, the Bush administration connived at North Korea's production of counterfeit 100 dollars bills and decided to defreeze its bank account, allowing Pyongyang to reap profits from this illegal activity, eventually proceeding to rescind the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, thereby betraying the trust of Japan, an ally of the United States.

 

Under the Agreed Framework, a mechanism was in place to halt fuel oil supplies and suspend construction of the light-water reactor in the event of North Korea putting the facility at Yongbyon back into operation, in violation of the agreement, thus guaranteeing the North's compliance with the accord.

 

The Washington-Pyongyang agreement this time, however, lacks any mechanism to prevent North Korea from resuming the facility's operation. It is considered almost certain that the North will sooner or later resume operating the facility on the slightest excuse, unless additional economic benefits are given.

 

The third problem with the delisting decision is that the United States has given little thought to the significance of nuclear facility inspections, which should be an integral part of efforts for any disarmament.

 

Although there can be no doubt that the United States has been overgenerous to North Korea, there is no use crying over spilled milk.

 

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Beware of 'salami tactic'

 

 

Confucius said, "Don't blame bygones." Now that things have come to such a pass, it seems there is no choice but to treat the North's promise that it will disable its nuclear facilities as better than nothing, even though the promise will probably be kept for six months or so.

 

>From now on, maximum possible efforts must be exerted to prod North Korea to accept verification of all its nuclear activities.

 

With the United States having already jettisoned its leverage, however, the extent to which Pyongyang may make concessions on the matter is anyone's guess.

 

Although we should let bygones be bygones, we can draw lessons from them.

 

The biggest among the lessons for Japan, which is seeking resolution of the issue of abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents, is the importance of not repeating the mistake made in the U.S.-North Korean negotiations: Washington's being taken in by what may be called Pyongyang's "salami tactic." The tactic, which North Korea excels in, is demanding concessions from a negotiating partner at each stage of talks bit by bit, like cutting a salami into thin slices, while giving little in return.

 

Japan, for its part, has stuck consistently to the principle of refusing to give any economic aid to the North as long as the abduction issue is left unresolved. This means that Japan's diplomacy has been given some backbone as far as this issue is concerned--a thing that has not been seen in the postwar annals of diplomacy of this country. Without this principle, Japan would have been sponged on by the North for money or something else at every phase of negotiations.

 

Let's suppose that North Korea was willing to make a full and final settlement of the abduction issue and went on to agree on a peace treaty with Japan. The rewards the North would gain by doing so would far outweigh those it has so far squeezed out of the United States with its salami tactic.

 

In other words, North Korea must be sufficiently motivated to resolve the abduction problem. Japan must be fully vigilant not to allow Pyongyang to make use of the salami-cutting trickery. The United States, for that matter, should consider taking advantage of Japan's position proactively as a resource common to our alliance that is available for a complete resolution of both the nuclear and abduction problems in their entirety. Until this approach proves successful, Washington should refrain from making trivial demands on Japan over Japan's stand vis-a-vis the North.

 

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Maximum priority on allies

 

 

Another lesson taught by the U.S. delisting of North Korea as a terrorism-sponsoring state is how important it is for this country to remind the United States repeatedly of the need to have sufficient consultations with its allies about issues involving North Korea.

 

If a proposal is made for developing the current framework of the six-party talks for denuclearization of North Korea into a multilateral organization for Northeastern Asia's regional security, Washington should commit to consulting beforehand with its allies on every item to be discussed there.

 

The United States, in light of the difficulty the Japanese government was forced to endure by the removal of North Korea from the terrorism blacklist, should be well aware of the importance of such prearrangements. Washington, too, in this sense, may have drawn a lesson, or at the very least, it should try to learn a lesson from this.

 

With North Korea having already become a country armed with nuclear weapons, what the United States should address as a matter of top priority is what military strategy must be worked out to cope with the menace of the North. This is the challenge that the United States should address in earnest along with its allies, Japan and South Korea, not at the venue of the six-way talks.

 

Okazaki served as Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He is currently a guest research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute.

 

(Nov. 3, 2008)

 

Monday, June 30, 2008 Taiwan's way with dignity By HISAHIKO OKAZAKI The inaugural address that Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou gave was titled "Taiwan's Renaissance." It was well-composed, reflecting the president's views clearly while not evoking excessive alarm or expectations on complex and sensitive issues. These include the future of Taiwan's democracy, relations with the United States, cross-strait relations and relations between Chinese- Taiwanese — those who came to Taiwan from China after the Nationalists (KMT) were defeated in the civil war with the Communists, and their descendants — and Taiwanese-Taiwanese. It is noteworthy that the address uses the expression "Taiwan's dignity," and premises the advance of cross-strait relations on whether international dignity is accorded to the island. While I have pointed out in the past the danger of Taiwan's being dragged into unification by China's strategy of accepting Beijing-proposed peace agreement talks, I have also written that I would be comfortable with such talks if the KMT pursued them on the condition that Taiwan would be accepted into the United Nations. Ideally, Taiwan should be admitted into the U.N. At the very least, it may be reasonable today to expect Chinese President Hu Jintao to be flexible enough to let Taiwan join international economic, social and health-care organizations to keep its dignity. In reality, Taiwan is a full member of the World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). If APEC extends an invitation to President Ma for a summit meeting, how would China react to it? It would be a test of Hu's flexibility. Behind Ma's policy of acknowledging "one China under respective interpretations" lies his thinking that Taiwan is part of the Chinese community. That thinking runs through his inaugural address. He said Taiwan is the only Chinese society in which power has shifted peacefully twice. This is significant in pressing China for democratization and emphasizing that Taiwan is more democratic than Singapore. This may embarrass the Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which places high priority on the identity of the Taiwanese people. However, if the one-China policy is defined as loosely as the Commonwealth of Nations, in which India acknowledges the crown of Britain as a symbol of the free bond, any interpretation is possible. In fact, Pakistan has repeatedly left and joined the Commonwealth. Thus the establishment of the Ma administration may provide a chance to break the diplomatic gridlock in East Asia. In a sense, China is caught in its own trap. During the DPP era, Beijing often invited KMT leaders to China and treated them respectably for the purpose of impacting Taiwan's political balance. To try to explain now that that was because the KMT was not in power is unreasonable. Beijing will have to formally contact the KMT's leader, who is Taiwan's president, in some way or another — possibly at an APEC summit. This would be a chance for Japan as well. With its hostile policy toward the DPP president of Taiwan, China used to stiffly oppose Japan's attempts to make contacts with Taiwan. Since the U.S. was also cold toward the DPP for some unexplainable reason, Japan had to pay heed to both China and the U.S. in dealing with Taiwan. Japan may no longer have to care about either's reaction. Since Taiwan and Japan have strong historical and economic ties, to treat Taiwan coldly in disregard of those ties is unnatural. Japan might now be freed from this bind. The DPP might be unhappy with Japan's about-face to establish friendly ties with the Taiwanese government under the control of KMT. Nevertheless, deepening relations with Japan would bring benefits that would be an asset for Taiwan when the DPP returns to power in the future — possibly four, eight or more years from now. When conducting cross-strait talks, the Ma administration must never give in on Taiwan's sovereignty and security. Any kind of "one country, two systems" formula is designed to set a time limit on Taiwan's freedom regardless of whether it is for half a century or a century. Again, Taiwan must not accept neutrality or any unilateral arms restrictions. There is no comparison between China and Taiwan in terms of size. Once security measures are abandoned, there will be none to defend Taiwan if the situation changes. Taiwan must keep this in mind.

Insights into the world /Japan's security not tied to U.S. presidential result

By Hisahiko Okazaki
Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun

   These days I am often asked with great seriousness about what would happen to Japan if a Democratic candidate won the upcoming U.S. presidential election. However, Japan is not the only country that cares about the outcome of the presidential contest.
   A high-ranking official of the Palestinian extremist organization Hamas declared that it hoped Democrat Barack Obama would win the election, according to Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior editor of the U.S. magazine Commentary.
   Schoenfeld also quotes a close aide to Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev as saying Sen. John McCain was the worst choice and Obama the best.
   Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's radical socialist president, also has lambasted McCain, calling him "a man of war."
   In Iran, according to Schoenfeld, a character named John McCain is a villain in a TV drama who is responsible for "orchestrating numerous conspiracies against the Islamic Republic."
   This time, the Japanese are reacting to the U.S. presidential campaign in an unusual way.
   In past U.S. presidential elections, many Japanese intellectuals believed individuals supporting the Democratic candidate were liberal and progressive, while those backing the Republican were reactionaries.
   Because of this, so-called intellectuals in this country almost always favored a Democratic candidate.
   Memories of Japan bashing
   This time around, though, many Japanese who have expressed an interest in the upcoming election appear apprehensive about the possible emergence of a Democratic administration in the United States.
   This is due to lingering memories of Japan bashing in the early stages of the Clinton administration in the first half of the 1990s. Certainly viewed from an objective standpoint, Japan bashing at that time was extremely high-handed.
   This is one of the reasons why there is still a strong sense of trepidation toward the United States among Japanese business leaders, who are conventionally conservative and well-disposed toward Washington.
   Another factor is that in the Clinton era both White House and State Department officials who formulated Asian policies were almost exclusively China experts.
   This contrasted sharply with the first term of the Bush administration from 2001 to 2005, which was characterized by an array of friends of Japan, headed by Richard Armitage.
   It is a general tendency that officials well versed in the Chinese language, not only in the United States but elsewhere, such as in the Indian Foreign Ministry, incline to be pro-Chinese.
   Given the rapid increase of Chinese influence over the past decade, fears understandably loom large over U.S. foreign policy having a pro-China bias in a Democratic administration.
   However, I believe there will be little difference between Democrats and Republicans when it comes to U.S. policy toward Japan.
   If the Republicans retain the presidency, it is uncertain whether the Armitage group will return to the White House. Republican heavyweights, such as Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, appear to be sympathetic toward China.
   Even in the case of a Democratic White House, the current state of affairs differs completely from the early 1990s, when the end to the Soviet military menace prompted the United States to swivel its eyes onto the economic threat from Japan.
   Richard Holbrook, foreign policy adviser to Sen. Hillary Clinton during the primary election campaign, early this year stressed that the Japan-U.S. alliance "remains the foundation of United States policy" in the Asia-Pacific region.
   Also noteworthy in this connection, the U.S. State Department at one time appeared to have opted to make decisions in the six-way talks on North Korea's nuclear program only through a dialogue with China. This has led to suspicions that the two countries are plotting U.S.-China condominium in East Asia.
   Recently, however, the State Department has repeatedly committed to acting in the interests of U.S. allies whenever discussing cooperation in multilateral talks in East Asia.

tagon saves the day
   
   It is also worthy of note that the Pentagon has been a reliable partner of Japan.
   When bilateral trade friction between the United States and Japan had sunk to its nadir in February 1995, the so-called "Nye Report" issued by the U.S. Defense Department saved the day for Japan.
   The report said: "We must not allow trade friction [between Japan and the United States] to undermine our security alliance."
   However, a high-ranking White House official allegedly attacked the report, saying the Pentagon's argument was tantamount to depriving Washington of its most potent leverage for making Japan comply with U.S. trade demands.
   Remembering this remark, chills ran down my spine at the thought of what could have happened if the Pentagon had not intervened.
   In the 1980s, during the last phase of the Cold War, Washington called upon its allies to boost cooperation with the United States to cope with the situation.
   Partly because its cooperation with the United States had been inadequate for a long time, Japan was quick to act. It helped realize a reversal of the military balance between the East and the West in the Far East.
   The Pentagon's report defending Japan, as the trade friction issue became increasingly grave, was issued because of this solid foundation of mutual trust that Jim Auer, director of Vanderbilt University's Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation, referred to as a "hidden success story."
   Irrespective of whether the U.S. administration in 2009 is Democratic or Republican, the Japan-U.S. alliance can remain strong in the face of any obstacle provided mutual trust in military cooperation remains firm.
   To ensure this, efforts must continue to be made to maintain and strengthen the bilateral military relationship of mutual trust.

'Sympathy budget' imperative
  
   Recently, there have been calls to end Japan's special host nation budgetary appropriations for U.S. forces in Japan. Known as the sympathy budget, these funds pay much of the cost of maintaining U.S. forces stationed in this country.
   I worked for the then Defense Agency three decades ago and the annual defense budget was below 1 percent of the gross national product. This is still the case.
   In addition, Japan is unable to exercise the right to collective self-defense. Therefore, we have remained heavily dependent on the United States for national security.
   Consequently, Japan believed it should at least pay the living expenses for U.S. military personnel stationed here, as well as their dependents.
   The sympathy budget has been a great success. When speaking of Japan-U.S. security ties, high-ranking U.S. officials invariably refer to this measure as generous and supportive.
   Opponents of the sympathy budget continue to ask how long this funding will last. However, since the budget was created in 1978, the circumstances necessitating it remain unchanged.
   U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Schieffer has often pointed out the deficiencies in Japan's budgetary appropriations for defense.
   As for Japan's right to collective self-defense, there is a need more than ever to enable this country to exercise that right.
   Out of consideration for Japan's domestic affairs, Washington stops short of making any demands on this matter officially. It is evident, though, that the United States wants this problem resolved as soon as possible.

No excuse for inaction
  
   When North Korea test-launched a number of missiles in 2006, a U.S. Aegis-equipped destroyer tracked them in the Sea of Japan. Because the Aegis vessel was fully occupied with tracking the missiles, the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces should have been prepared to protect it from a possible North Korean attack. However, Japan could not do so because it could not exercise the right to collective self-defense.
   Moreover, in 2007, Japan's Aegis-equipped destroyer Kongo successfully conducted a missile-intercept test, bringing the nation's missile defense system closer to reality.
   Meanwhile, the government is in favor of transferring U.S. marines from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam to reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on the prefecture.
   The government cannot justify its inability to shoot down missiles in the event of a North Korean attack on U.S. marines, who are helping to ensure Japan's security. Japan should be able to help them if they are attacked, whether they are in Guam or Hawaii or on the West Coast of the U.S. mainland.
   Fortunately, only a few experts in the United States know of this situation. What would happen to the Japan-U.S. security framework should the U.S. Congress and the general public decide to address Japan's failure to defend the marines, as well as U.S. Aegis-equipped ships?
   Instead of feeling uneasy about whether the U.S. presidential election will end in a Democratic win, we should address squarely and urgently the challenge of Japan's right to collective self-defense.
  
   Okazaki served as Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He is currently a guest research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute.