2009年7月アーカイブ

When I read former Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata's remarks in the newspaper, disclosing a secret agreement on port visits by U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons, I was excited and hopeful that there would be new developments on this issue.
 

Although I have not contacted Murata, it is obvious that he sacrificed his own interest in making those remarks. Civil servants are legally obliged to maintain the secrecy of information they have obtained in the course of performing their duties and this rule applies even after retirement. Penalties of up to one year's imprisonment can be imposed for violating this rule. It is evident that he chose to take the risk and tell the truth.
 

While such self-sacrifice is perhaps needed to change the government's rigid position over the years, I am disappointed that nothing has happened since the remarks were made.
 

Certainly the government is taking a "safe" position to make sure that nobody gets hurt. If the secret agreement does not really exist, there is no secret to keep, so no one has the obligation to keep the information secret. Everything will vanish into oblivion once again. However, such oblivion takes place only on the part of Japan. This does not hold water at all in the international community because the whole affair is like an ostrich hiding its head in the sand to flee from a hunter.
 

When I met the late Dr. Edwin Reischauer (former U.S. ambassador to Japan), he referred to "Foreign Minister Ohira's explicit promise" but was not exactly indignant but rather exasperated by the absurdity of the situation. Furthermore, the meeting between Reischauer and Ohira in April 1963 has been confirmed by U.S. diplomatic documents subsequently. What I am worried about is that if Japan continues to carry on like this, it will be unable to engage in strategic dialogue with the United States to reinforce the bilateral alliance.
 

In another article I wrote previously for this column, I mentioned that the Japan-U.S. strategic dialogue proposed by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage came to nothing while the U.S.-China strategic dialogue conducted under his successor Robert Zoellick was very successful. The U.S. side showed great enthusiasm for both dialogues. So the U.S. should not be blamed for the failure of the Japan-U.S. talks.
 

Many people say that China is now more important for the U.S., so Japan will be abandoned. Such worries are completely unnecessary under the present situation as far as the U.S. side is concerned. Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has said to the effect: "The best way to deal with China is to strengthen U.S. partnership with Japan as much as possible. That is the only option. Without such a foundation, nothing can be accomplished in Asia."
 

Here, what I am worried about is that Japan, due to its incompetence in strategic dialogue, may not be in a position to respond to the U.S.' good intentions.
 

In light of North Korea's nuclear armament, there have been noisy discussions on the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella — the so-called extended deterrence — for Japan. A discussion on nuclear strategy is inevitable between allies when they discuss military strategy. As a matter of fact, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) regularly discusses nuclear strategy.
 

Needless to say, it is also desirable to have a similar venue for consultation and planning between Japan and the U.S. But how can common strategy be discussed when Japan continues to deny even something it once promised?
 

Whether Murata's remarks constitute a violation of his confidentiality obligation may be a trivial matter to him, but I think this is not a violation. If this case is brought to court, the substance of the secret — whether it is indeed a matter that needs to be kept confidential — will be examined. Blowing the whistle on wrongdoings in the bureaucracy does not violate the confidentiality obligation. In this case, the secret agreement has already been disclosed in U.S. diplomatic documents, so unless there are very special or overriding reasons, it does not need to be kept confidential.
 

What I had hoped after the Murata remarks was that the government would stop its temporizing responses soon and revert to intellectual integrity.
 

With the subsequent advancement in military technology, the impact of this issue on reality has diminished. The issue here is intellectual integrity that forms the foundation of the relationship of trust between allies and strategic dialogue between them. If Japan engages in honest strategic dialogue now, the conclusion may well be that unless there is a major change in the situation, port calls by U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons will be unnecessary.
 

I look forward to a change in the Liberal Democratic Party government's position in the future.
 

In case a Democratic Party of Japan administration comes into being, I pray that it will break away from the inertia of the LDP era, acknowledge the existence of the international commitment between Ohira and Reischauer, and show its intellectual integrity in creating a new venue for Japan-U.S. strategic consultations.
 

Soon after the inauguration of Japan's new administration, the mass media will probably try to press the government to reconfirm the positions it has upheld until now, including the interpretation of the three-point nonnuclear principle. I hope the DPJ will say without being bound by the preconceptions of the LDP era that it will make a comprehensive review of all the related matters as the need arises and avoid making any premature commitment. Unless it is able to do so, the two-party system will be meaningless; and if it is able to do so, the DPJ's victory will have historical significance.
 

I hope that people of intellectual integrity liberated from past positions, regardless of whether they are rightist or leftist in ideology, will no longer say things like "Japan has the right to collective self-defense but is unable to exercise it."

 The Obama administration has shown great good will toward Japan. This was evidenced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's testimony at her Senate confirmation hearing, her choice of Japan as the first country she visited after taking office and the fact that Prime Minister Taro Aso was the first foreign leader President Barack Obama met with after his inauguration.
 

This is an epoch-making development in Japan-U.S. relations attesting to the success of diplomacy on both sides. As a matter of fact, both Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell have both made remarks emphasizing that these are proof of the importance the Obama administration attaches to Japan.
 

However, the Japanese media at that time mostly focused on reporting on then Minister of Finance Shoichi Nakagawa's embarrassing behavior at the Group of 20 meeting in Rome and failed to convey the United States' gesture of good will adequately to the public. In my opinion, the Japanese media have also demeaned themselves in this incident.
 

The Obama administration's favorable consideration given to Japan is not only demonstrated in its gestures, but also expressed clearly in the lineup of senior officials in charge of East Asian affairs. While there are many Americans who know Europe and the Americas well, few are knowledgeable about Asia. Policymaking related to Asia tends to rely very much on the knowledge of officials in charge of East Asia.
 

During the first half of the Clinton era, when frictions between Japan and the U.S. were serious, officials in charge of East Asia in the White House and the State and Defense Departments were all China experts. With no one knowledgeable about Japan, Japan was basically helpless.
 

However, the present chief policymaker on East Asia at the Department of Defense is Assistant Secretary Wallace Gregson, who used to be the Marine Corps commander in Okinawa and knows Japan well. Moreover, Kurt Campbell, who places high priority on the Japan-U.S. alliance, became the new assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific.
 

This is good news for Japan. On the other hand, what can Japan do in this situation? Actually, the Pacific Forum and three other groups held four seminars attended by more than 50 Asia experts last year. The result of the discussions was published in February as new proposals on Asian policy for the Obama administration. It is said that Campbell exercised strong leadership in the drafting of the report.
 

In one passage, the word "enough!" was used. What it meant was that since the U.S. is committed to the alliance, Japan should not be talking about such things as "Japan passing," and be so wishy-washy. The report demands that Japan, instead, should think of ways to contribute to the alliance on its own.
 

Campbell is one of the few experts on Japan from the Democratic Party camp. During the last days of the Clinton administration, he reportedly was fed up with the stream of Japanese politicians and business leaders calling on him.
 

However, in his recent hearings in the Senate, he did not seem to have been nonplussed by this tedious experience. He stated in no uncertain terms that the Japan-U.S. alliance is at the center of U.S. policy in Asia and that the U.S. should clearly convey its commitment to the alliance to its Japanese friends.
 

Shortly after the inauguration of the Bush administration, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage proposed a vice ministerial dialogue to strengthen the bilateral alliance. At that time, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was unable to respond to this effectively. So Armitage left office in disappointment. In contrast, his successor Robert Zoellick started the U.S.-China vice ministerial dialogue, which was hugely successful from the first round. China immediately obtained the status of a "stakeholder."
 

This time, the U.S. side is again hopeful that moves to help propel the Japan-U.S. relationship forward will be made under Campbell and Gregson's watch.
 

The political situation in Japan is such that the state of affairs after Prime Minister Taro Aso dissolves the Lower House remains completely uncertain. But at least, the Aso administration should still be in power when Campbell visits Japan. Even during the little time left, we hope that meaningful exchange of views with the new Obama administration will take place, and the path for the strengthening of the alliance in the future, even just portion of it, will be laid down for future administrations. Otherwise, the opportunity presented by the Campbell-Gregson team, as well as the team made up of James Jones, Hillary Clinton, and Robert Gates may be wasted, and they may become frustrated with Japan at an early stage.
 

It is also becoming evident what Japan needs to do. Recent statements by Japan experts in the U.S. show that although they had been coy in the past about their expectations about Japan exercising the right of collective self-defense, they are now speaking up on this subject. Next will come the issue of Japan boosting its defense capabilities in order to maintain the deterrence of the bilateral alliance.
 

The immediate issue for the two countries is the realignment of military bases, but this is a complicated issue linked to local circumstances in Okinawa. Certain aspects of the issue cannot be resolved by the central government's policies. So prospects remain unclear.
 

While it goes without saying that Japan needs to make efforts to resolve this problem, this does not mean that the more fundamental questions of the right of collective self-defense and Japan's need to increase defense spending can be deferred.

 【正論】村田発言の誠意を無にするな　元駐タイ大使・岡崎久彦
2009.7.7 02:33

■今回も失望した事後対応
 

　核問題に関する村田良平・元外務次官の発言を新聞で見た時は、私はこの問題の新たな発展を期待して胸を躍らせた。
 

　村田氏とは電話一本していないが、捨て身の発言であることは聞かなくても分かる。公務員には職務上知り得た秘密を守る義務があり、それは退職後も適用され、懲役１年に及ぶ罰則もある。その危険を敢（あ）えて冒しても真実を語ろうという覚悟と見受けられた。
 

　永年の牡蠣（かき）がらのように固まった政府答弁を崩すにはこの位の捨て身の業が必要なのであるが、その後の展開は従来と全く変わらないのには失望した。
 

　これは、誰も傷つかない「事無かれ策」でもある。そういう事実は無いというのなら、守るべき秘密はもともと存在しないのだから保秘義務もない。すべては再び沈黙の中に葬り去られることになる。ただそれは、日本だけの沈黙であり、国際的には全く通用しない。あたかも駝鳥（だちょう）が叢（くさむら）に首を突っ込んで狩人から隠れたつもりであるのと同じである。
 

　ライシャワー博士（元駐日大使）に生前お目にかかった時は「大平外相ははっきり約束していたのに」と、憤然としてと言うよりも、馬鹿馬鹿しくて話にならないという調子で語られた。またその後米国の外交文書の中に、その会談の事実が確認されたという。私が心配するのは、いつまでもこんなことをやっていると、日米同盟強化のための日米間の戦略的対話ができないということである。
 
 

■保秘義務に反しない発言
 

　この前の正論にも書いたが、ブッシュ前政権時代のアーミテージ氏の日米戦略対話は何ら実を結ばず、そのあとのゼーリック氏の米中戦略対話は大きな業績を残した。両方とも、米国側は相当な意気込みでやった対話であり、この失敗で米国側の咎（とが）に帰すべきものは何もない。
 

よく、アメリカは今や中国の方が重要で日本は置き去りにされるだろうと言う人は多いが、アメリカ側に関する限り現状ではその心配は全く無い。キャンベル氏は言っている。「中国を扱う最善の方法は日本とのパートナーシップをできる限り強化することであり、他の選択肢は無い。その基礎が無ければアジアでは何もできない」
 

　そこで私が心配するのは、日本が戦略対話の無能力者であるためにせっかくのアメリカ側の好意的姿勢に応えられないことである。
 

　北朝鮮の核武装を前にして、日本に対する米国の核の傘の実効性の問題、いわゆる拡大抑止力の問題の議論が喧（やかま）しい。同盟国間で軍事戦略を論じる以上、核戦略論は避けて通れない。現にＮＡＴＯ（北大西洋条約機構）では、核計画グループＮＰＧがＮＡＴＯの核戦略を随時討議している。
 

　日米間にも当然に同じような協議と計画の場が望ましい。しかし、日本がいったん約束したことまで知らないとシラを切っている状況で、共通戦略などどうやって議論するのだろう。
 

　村田氏の発言が保秘義務に反するかなどは、村田氏にとっては末梢（まっしょう）事であろうが、私は違反にならないと思う。裁判になれば秘密の実質的内容、つまりそれが真に保秘義務の対象とすべき秘密かが問われる。役所内の不正の内部告発は守秘義務に抵触しない。それは本来秘密にすべきでないものを漏らしているからである。このケースもすでにアメリカの外交文書で公表されているものであり、極めて特殊かつ姑息な理由以外では秘密にする必要はないものである。
 
 

■将来の手を縛られない方策
 

　今回の発言で私が期待したことは、もうそろそろ従来の姑息（こそく）な政府答弁はやめて知的正直さ（インテレクチュアル・インテグリティー）に立ち戻ることである。
 

　その後の軍事技術の進歩によって、この問題が実態に及ぼす影響は少なくなっている。問題は、同盟の信頼関係、戦略対話の基礎である知的正直さである。今正直に戦略対話をすれば、核兵器搭載艦船の寄港は情勢の大きな変化が無いかぎり不必要であるという結論が出る可能性もある。
 

私は今後とも、自民党政府の姿勢の変化を期待する。
 

　民主党政権の場合は、願わくば、自民党時代の惰性を脱して、大平ライシャワー間の国際的約束の存在を認め、民主党の知的正直さを示した上で日米戦略協議の場を新たに構築して欲しい。
 

　マスコミなどは、政権成立早々、非核三原則の解釈も含めて従来の政府答弁の再確認を求めるであろう。民主党としては、すべての問題について自民党時代の先入観に捉われす、必要に応じて抜本的に見直す用意があると言って、過早に言質を与えないで欲しい。それができてこそ二大政党制の意味があり、民主党の勝利は歴史的意義があることになる。
 

　過去の答弁に捉われなければ、たとえば集団的自衛権について、「権利はあるが行使はできない」などという答弁は、イデオロギーの左右を問わず、知的に正直な人間が到底口にすることができなくなるであろう、と期待する。（おかざき　ひさひこ）

Japan's Obama Opportunity -Pro-Japan Obama officials could deepen the alliance.

By HISAHIKO OKAZAKI From today's Wall Street Journal Asia.
With the appointment of Kurt Campbell this week to the State Department's most important Asia position, the Obama administration has once again demonstrated its strong friendship with Japan.
 

Mr. Campbell was a deputy assistant secretary in the Defense Department in the last years of Clinton Administration and one of the rare strong supporters of the U.S.-Japan alliance in that administration. In his confirmation hearings for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs last month, he said: "The best way to engage China is with the strongest possible partnership with Japan and for Japanese friends to know that we are behind them. . . So I think it's non-negotiable, a strong partnership with Japan. . . And if we don't have that foundation, then virtually nothing else is possible in Asia."
 

His remarks are important, because the U.S. often delegates policy decisions on Asia to area specialists, particularly to either China or Japan hands. The classic example is Stanley Hornbeck, who ran "Far Eastern affairs" through the critical years of 1928-1944. He is still derided by historians for having wagered that the Japanese would not resort to a war, a view that had disastrous consequences.
 

Mr. Campbell isn't alone in his support for Japan. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has already demonstrated her commitment to the alliance by making Tokyo her first foreign destination earlier this year. Assistant Secretary Wallace Gregson is charged with the Far Eastern affairs at the Pentagon. As a former commander of the Marine Division in Okinawa, he knows Japan well.
 

This is a remarkable turnaround for U.S. Democrats given the legacy of the Clinton years, when Japan bashing reached its peak. Almost all of Far Eastern affairs posts in the White House, State Department and the Pentagon were occupied by China experts. The Japanese tried desperately to find sympathizers for Japan, but to no avail.
 

Now the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance rests not on the Washington but on Tokyo. This is not a new problem. In the early years of the Bush administration, most of the East Asia-related posts were dominated by friends of Japan. But that didn't matter: although then-Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage proposed a strategic dialogue with his Japanese counterparts, he was soon frustrated by the tepid response from Tokyo. In contrast, Mr. Armitage's successor, Robert Zoellick, started a strategic dialogue with China and won an immediate and resounding response.
 

It's hard to understand why efforts to reach out to Tokyo failed where olive branches to Beijing succeeded. China has an autocratic system capable of producing charismatic leaders and making quick and authoritative decisions. Japan's democratically elected politicians tend to make decisions by consensus. It may be the lingering influence of leftist anti-American propaganda of the Cold War time, taking advantage of the postwar Japanese pacifist tendencies. Cooler relations may also simply be a product of personal characteristics of the individuals involved at the time.
 

Whatever the reason, Japan's response to America's outreach has usually been excruciatingly slow. This trend looks likely to continue. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is trailing in election polls, and the most likely outcome that can be expected for the country is political paralysis.
 

Despite this circumstance, the Obama administration and Americans should be patient. Every poll has shown that the Japanese are the world's strongest supporters of the United States. No major political parties in either country are opposed to the U.S.-Japan alliance. There have always been quite a few people, within the bureaucracy and among intellectuals, advocating a stronger alliance. The military-to-military relations are excellent.
 

This backdrop will not change in the foreseeable future. The U.S.-Japan alliance is sanguine, if immobile. Time will not hurt our cause. Rather, in the face of Chinese military build-up, the alliance will naturally be strengthened in the long run, even if that happens at a glacial speed.