2009年1月アーカイブ
［地球を読む］集団的自衛権行使 日米同盟堅持の証し 岡崎久彦
◇外交評論家
私が集団的自衛権の問題を取り上げてきて以来もう４０年近くになる。もちろん、その前からも先人たちの努力があり、その間限りない挫折を繰り返しているうちに、近年それを取り巻く景色が少し変わってきたような感がある。
世論は変わった。この問題についての、世論調査などはないと思うが、４０年前ならば、集団的自衛権行使を支持する世論などは１％あったかどうかさえ疑問であるが、今なら賛成の方が多いだろうと思う。安倍内閣がその見直しのための委員会を設置しても、麻生総理が平然と「集団的自衛権は行使すべきだ」と言っても世論の反発は皆無である。
もともとこの問題は常識の問題である。かつてフランスの国防次官訪日の際、私は、「日本海で米艦と自衛艦が併走していて、自衛艦が攻撃されれば米艦は直ちに救援するが、米艦が先に攻撃された場合は自衛艦は何もできない。それが集団的自衛権の問題だ」と説明した。いかにも頭の切れるエリートらしい彼は言った。「理論は分かる。しかしそれは現実の世界、リアル・ワールドでは存在しえない問題である」
自衛艦は当然同盟国軍艦の救援にかけつけ戦闘に従事する、と彼は考えたのである。それが常識であろう。同盟国米国の軍艦が沈められるのを自衛艦が手を拱（こまぬ）いて見ているわけにはいかないと誰もが考えるであろう。
もし、自衛艦があえて米艦を救援すれば、その結果どうなるであろうか。刑法上は何の問題もない。刑法第３６条は、「急迫不正の侵害に対して、自己または他人の権利を防衛するため、やむを得ずにした行為は、罰しない」と言っている。
問題は自衛隊関係の法令に違反しているかどうかであるが、違反の法的根拠が集団的自衛権の行使禁止である場合、憲法裁判に持ち込まれると、処罰する政府の側の立場は弱い。憲法の規定に明示的な法的根拠があるわけでなく、政府法制局の憲法解釈があるだけだからである。
憲法の有権的解釈権は政府でなく裁判所にある。裁判所はすでに日本には独立国として固有の自衛権があると認め、自衛隊を合憲としている。
その自衛権を個別的と集団的の二つに分けて後者の行使を禁じるなどという、世界で類例のない、粗放、大胆不敵な判断を最高裁が下すはずはない。個人の正当防衛権に当たるものが国家の自衛権であるとして類比すれば、法哲学の考え方の帰結は明白である。
◆反対論世論の支持失う
もともと非常識な話なのである。権利があって行使できないなど、ばかな話はない。集団的自衛権は、憲法の規定にのっとって国会が批准した国連憲章、平和条約に明記してあるのだから、憲法の国際条約順守義務に従って国内法上の権利である。麻生総理は前から一貫して現行解釈はおかしいと言っておられる。
景色が変わってきたもう一つの理由は、日米同盟の重要性の認識が深まったことである。３０年前は、それこそ「同盟」という言葉さえ使えなかった。今は、種々の世論調査の結果に出ている通り、国民の間で日米同盟の重要性の認識は完全に定着している。
そして同盟の維持強化のために集団的自衛権行使が必要なことも公然と指摘されるようになった。米国は初めは遠慮して言わなかったが、２０００年の「アーミテージ・ナイ報告」、最近ではマイケル・オースリン氏（米研究所員）などの知日派の論説の中で当然のことのように指摘されている。
特にオバマ政権ができて以来、この前の民主党政権であるクリントン政権第１期の日米摩擦の記憶が蘇（よみがえ）り、日米同盟の維持、強化が課題となっている。日本側から、米国に同盟堅持の意思表明を頼むぐらいの外交的能力はある。問題は、それなら日本側は何をしてくれるのですかと問われた場合、本命は、どうしても、集団的自衛権の行使となる。それ以外はその場しのぎの措置でしかない。
それではどうすれば良いのであろうか。今まで私が想定していたシナリオは、特命委員会の答申を受けて政府が新たな解釈を闡明（せんめい）して、政府答弁を修正する。それから今までは当面の必要のために無理して自ら手をしばった法令もあるので、漸次関係法令を改正していくという手続きである。
しかし、最近村田良平元外務次官の論を読んでハタと感じるところがあった。「委員会を設けたこと自体不要であり、不見識とすら感じた。（中略）総理大臣として責任において、日本は集団的自衛権は保有している、しかしその行使は慎重であるべきであり、最終的には総理大臣たる自分が判断すると述べ、もし法制局長官が異議を唱えれば、辞任を求めるべきだ。憲法上日本の総理はその権限を持っている」と。
私自身この「不見識」なる委員会のメンバーであり、今後も今までのこの手続きに従うつもりであるが、もし総理がそう決断していただけるのならそれが良いに決まっている。
ただ、その際、関係法令改正は可及的速やかに行うと述べておくことも重要である。
さきに述べたように、いざという時に現地の部隊が集団的自衛権を行使しても裁判所が違法と判断する可能性はほとんどない。ただ、戦闘というものは、日頃あらゆる想定の下に訓練を重ねておいて、初めて、実戦に役立つものである。アメリカにしても、いざとなればなんとかします、と言われただけでは、同盟間の戦略戦術が成り立たない。
原則として権利行使可能と宣言した上で、法律はいつか改正されるという見通しを与え、改正された場合に備えて実戦の訓練をしておけば良い。それが裁判沙汰（ざた）となれば、究極的には無罪となることはすでに述べたとおりである。
もう動き出すべき時期は来ている。理論的な反対は、時を追って一般の支持を失っている。少なくとも麻生総理が時に触れて持論を繰り返されるだけで、事態は進む。
そして、もう自衛隊は、いざという場合は集団的自衛権を行使する覚悟でいてほしい。そうでなければ同盟が保（も）たない。
◇岡崎久彦氏 １９３０年、中国大連生まれ。駐米公使、駐サウジアラビア、駐タイ大使などを歴任。現在、岡崎研究所長。
写真＝岡崎久彦氏
≪小泉氏に２つのお願い≫
小泉元総理との私的な会話の内容を引用することをお許し頂きたい。もちろん、引用は私の発言部分だけである。
平成１６年（２００４）７月の参院選後、９月の内閣改造を控えた夏のころだった。
第２次小泉改造内閣の発足を前にして私は２つのお願いを申し上げた。それは、集団的自衛権の解釈変更と消費税増額については、結果としては何もできないかもしれないが、少なくとも、「この内閣の間はしない」と始めからおっしゃらないでください、ということであった。
内閣発足早々の記者会見や国会の質疑で、重要問題についての総理の意見を求めて、その回答で、その後の内閣の手をしばってしまうのが、マスコミ、野党の常套（じょうとう）手段だからである。
小泉総理は他人の意見などなかなかお聞きにならない方だから、私の意見がどこまで取り入れられたかはわからないが、私が知る限り退任まで、その種の否定的発言は全くされていない。
この２つの問題は共通しているところがある。日本という国の将来を考えると、いずれ、避けて通れない問題であることは、誰もが知っている。しかし、従来の政治の常識ではそれを今言うことは政治的にマイナスであり、この内閣の間はしない、と言って先延ばししておくのが無難であることである。
≪消費税と集団的自衛権≫
小泉総理は発足直前のＴＶ発言では集団的自衛権の解釈変更の必要に触れられた。しかし、その後９・１１テロのおかげで、数々の防衛関係立法措置を講じることが優先され、その話は立ち消えとなった。そして次の改造内閣発足に際しては、「この内閣の間では」と、否定的発言となったのである。
そこで、私は最後のチャンスを事前につぶさないように、先のお願いをした次第である。
２つの事案に共通なのは、国際的に他の先進国との比較で、日本だけいかにもヘンだということと、政治家がこれと直面することを避けるために一見格好の良い口実を設けていることである。
日本の消費税率は先進国の中で異常に低い。中谷巌氏の分析によればそれが、日本が今やアメリカに次ぐ格差社会となってしまったことに現れているということになる。
日本の貧困率は他の先進国とあまり変わらないが、所得再配分後、つまり社会保障などを受けた後の数字では、断然高くなっている。他の先進国はちょうど消費税が高い分だけ高負担高福祉政策を行っているわけである。
国家財政のバランスを考えれば、当然この問題に行き当たる。しかし、まずは改革による冗費削減だと逃げをうっていれば格好はつく。
集団的自衛権の問題を避ける通常の口実は、解釈変更など姑息（こそく）なことをしないで、堂々と憲法を改正すべきだということである。
≪塵芥の如き世間の評価≫
そもそも集団的自衛権行使の制限が日本の国益に及ぼす害を認識しているのならば、それを是正する手段が二者択一である必要はない。できるところからしていくのが正しい。そして、憲法改正など簡単にできると誰も思っていないことを条件とするのは、サボタージュ以外の何ものでもない。
麻生総理は最近とかく批判の対象となっているが、そんな世上の評は浮草の如（ごと）きものである。私が感心しているのは２点である。１つは３年後の消費税増額を決して譲らないことである。これは日本の財政経済について確固たる見識があって初めてできることである。
かつて消費税導入で内閣支持が急落し、秘書の自殺もあって引退直前という時期に訪タイした竹下総理が、消費税だけは後世に残せる業績だと思うと淡々と私に語られた。その国を思う見識に深い感銘を受けたことを思いだす。
もう１つは、麻生総理が「集団的自衛権の解釈は変えるべきだと、ずっと同じことを言ってきた」と平然と発言されたことである。
この発言を今後とも続けていただきたい。
風評によれば内閣法制局は総理がこの発言を繰り返されないよう根回しをしていると言う。内閣法制局は政府の諮問に答えるのが任務であり、自説を維持するために政府部内の根回しをするが如きは分際を心得ない行為である。風評が真実かどうかは確かめる必要はあるが、もし本当ならば、糾弾されるべきである。
麻生内閣は、この２つについて、不退転の見識を示し続けるだけで、安易な口先の妥協を許さず信念を貫いた総理としての評価に値する。
要は国益であり、世上の毀誉褒貶（きよほうへん）などは塵芥（じんかい）の如きものと考えるべきである。（おかざき ひさひこ）
正論：１月２２日（木）掲載
Insights into the World
Time to resolve issue of collective self-defense
By Hisahiko Okazaki / Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun
Nearly 40 years have passed since I first took up the problem of Japan's right to collective self-defense. I am not as presumptious as to claim that I was the first propounder but I certainly belonged to the minority.
In recent years, however, I believe there have been significant changes in regard to this matter and there seems to be no doubt that public opinion has shifted on this issue.
A government special panel was created in 2007 under the administration of then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to review the conventional government approach to the matter. Last September, Prime Minister Taro Aso said forthrightly, "I've been saying the same thing for years--that essentially the government interpretation of the nation's right to collective self-defense must be changed."
And there was no distinct opposition to his statement, either from opposition parties or leftist media.
===
A matter of common sense
Essentially, the core of the problem comes down to common sense.
When a French deputy defense minister visited Japan, I explained the situation as follows: "In the event of a Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel being attacked by an enemy ship while traveling with a U.S. warship in the Sea of Japan, the U.S. warship would immediately go to the aid of the MSDF vessel. But if the U.S. vessel came under attack, the MSDF vessel wouldn't be able to do anything. That's just the way it is, because of Japan's position on collective self-defense."
The deputy minister, who was a typical French intellectual, replied: "I can see how that works in theory. But surely that problem wouldn't arise in the real world."
He said it would be only natural for the MSDF vessel to assist the U.S. ship if it were attacked, and that the MSDF should therefore engage in any such fighting.
His way of thinking is commonsensical. Nobody except for Japanese defense experts and politicians would consider it acceptable for an MSDF vessel to stand by doing nothing if a vessel belonging to the United States, the key ally of Japan, was on the verge of being sunk in front of the MSDF vessel by an enemy assault.
What would happen if an MSDF vessel dared to assist a U.S. warship?
This act cannot be punishable in terms of this country's criminal law.
Article 36 of the Criminal Code stipulates: "An act unavoidably performed to protect the right of oneself or any other person against imminent and unlawful infringement is not punishable."
The phrase "right of oneself or any other person" in this article is significant.
The question, however, is whether the act of the MSDF ship should be considered a violation of any laws or regulations relating to the Self-Defense Forces.
Any punitive measure taken against the commander of the ship by the government would have to be based on the ban on exercising the right to collective self-defense. But if the issue went to court, the case for the constitutionality of the government ban would surely be weak.
This is because there is no provision at all in the Constitution that explicitly prohibits the exercising of collective self-defense. The ban comes only from an interpretation by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau.
The authority to interpret the Constitution, however, rests in the hands of courts, not of the government. The court has already handed down rulings stating that this country does have the right to self-defense as an inherent right of an independent state.
There is little possibility of the Supreme Court issuing a verdict that would be so pretentious as to back the government's stance, a unique position in the world that divides the concept of self-defense into subcategories--individual self-defense and collective self-defense, and prohibits the exercise of the latter.
If we apply what constitutes legitimate self-defense for an individual citizen to the self-defense of a country, the conclusion we should reach is self-evident when judged through the prism of basic legal philosophy.
All of the hullabaloo over the matter has been preposterous from the very beginning.
In light of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan between the Allied Powers and Japan, which were ratified under the Constitution, Japan has the right to collective self-defense. This right has rooted solidly in its constitutional obligations to abide by international treaties.
In some situations, the government could opt for self-imposed restraint on exercising the right as a matter of political choice. But it is absurd to argue that Japan has the right to collective defense, but nevertheless cannot exercise this right as the standing governmental interpretation asserts.
===
Public understanding deeper
Another factor behind the changing landscape surrounding issues of collective self-defense may be the deepening public understanding in recent years of how important the Japan-U.S. alliance is for this country.
Up until about 30 years ago, it was virtually taboo in Japan even to utter the word "alliance" in public. Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki denied the military dimension of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
But as various opinion surveys in recent years have shown, the perception of the significance of the alliance between Japan and the United States has become firmly rooted in the Japanese public's mind. Indeed, many people now openly say this country should be ready to exercise the right of collective self-defense to help maintain and bolster the Japan-U.S. alliance.
The United States used to refrain from commenting on Japan's constitutional issues, leaving the matter to be decided by the Japanese themselves. But recently, the United States has started speaking out, as shown, for example, by the 2000 Armitage-Nye report and more recently, commentaries by Michael Auslin, a resident scholar with the American Enterprise Institute, a U.S. think tank.
The launch of the U.S. Democratic administration of President Barack Obama has brought back memories of the friction between Tokyo and Washington during the first half of Bill Clinton's administration, highlighting the importance of maintaining and boosting bilateral relations of alliance.
Japan, of course, has sufficient diplomatic muscle to win a verbal reassurance from the United States over its willingness to keep the Japan-U.S. alliance intact.
But if the U.S. side were to ask what Japan would do in exchange for such a reassurance, attention would certainly focus on the issue of Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense. Anything less would merely be a half-measure.
What should Japan do under such circumstances?
The scenario I long had in mind and was trying to achieve was that the government would declare its adoption of a new interpretation on the issue of collective self-defense in the wake of a report by the above-mentioned special advisory panel to the prime minister.
I also envisioned the government would subsequently address the task of gradually revising the laws and regulations, which, due to the current interpretation, have placed the government in a quandary.
But on reading a recent book by former Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata, I felt like I had encountered some fresh thinking.
"I could not help but feel it unnecessary to create the panel [for reviewing collective self-defense matters], and that launching the panel was disrespectful. The prime minister can simply declare that Japan can exercise collective self-defense," Murata writes.
He goes on to say: "The prime minister, while noting that the exercise of the right should be made with the greatest care, should declare that it is up to him to make a final decision on the matter. And if the head of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau takes exception to that, the prime minister will have to seek his resignation, since under the Constitution the prime minister has the power to do that."
Actually, I am a member of the panel Murata referred to as "disrespectful," and I intend to continue working on the procedures the panel is supposed to follow. But should the prime minister decide to issue a declaration as suggested by Murata, I would have no qualms about agreeing with his decision as the best possible solution.
===
Getting ready to fight
In making the declaration, it would be important for the prime minister to state clearly that the existing laws and regulations relating to the right of collective self-defense should be revised as quickly as possible.
As mentioned above, there is little possibility of the exercising of the right being ruled illegal by the judiciary.
It is also worth pointing out, though, that a nation's fighting capabilities can hardly be adequate without sufficient training exercises in peacetime. Japan's likelihood to exercise the right in a contingency alone would, in the eyes of the United States, be insufficient in preparing for a joint military operations under the bilateral security pact.
On the assumption that Japan, as a matter of principle, can exercise the right to collective self-defense and that relevant laws can be revised sooner or later, it would be reasonable for the government to allow practice maneuvers presupposing actual law revisions. And if such maneuvers were brought before the court, there is no doubt the Self-Defense Forces members involved would ultimately be found innocent.
I believe the entire issue of collective self-defense already has begun to move toward a resolution. But the most expedient way of accelerating this process will be for Aso to take every opportunity to present his own views on the matter.
The SDF, for their part, should be resolutely prepared to exercise the right to collective self-defense in the event of a crisis and prepare for it through peacetime exercise and maneuvers. Otherwise the Japan-U.S. alliance will hardly be sustainable.
Okazaki served as Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He is currently a guest research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute.
(Jan. 26, 2009)
Time to resolve issue of collective self-defense
By Hisahiko Okazaki / Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun
Nearly 40 years have passed since I first took up the problem of Japan's right to collective self-defense. I am not as presumptious as to claim that I was the first propounder but I certainly belonged to the minority.
In recent years, however, I believe there have been significant changes in regard to this matter and there seems to be no doubt that public opinion has shifted on this issue.
A government special panel was created in 2007 under the administration of then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to review the conventional government approach to the matter. Last September, Prime Minister Taro Aso said forthrightly, "I've been saying the same thing for years--that essentially the government interpretation of the nation's right to collective self-defense must be changed."
And there was no distinct opposition to his statement, either from opposition parties or leftist media.
===
A matter of common sense
Essentially, the core of the problem comes down to common sense.
When a French deputy defense minister visited Japan, I explained the situation as follows: "In the event of a Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel being attacked by an enemy ship while traveling with a U.S. warship in the Sea of Japan, the U.S. warship would immediately go to the aid of the MSDF vessel. But if the U.S. vessel came under attack, the MSDF vessel wouldn't be able to do anything. That's just the way it is, because of Japan's position on collective self-defense."
The deputy minister, who was a typical French intellectual, replied: "I can see how that works in theory. But surely that problem wouldn't arise in the real world."
He said it would be only natural for the MSDF vessel to assist the U.S. ship if it were attacked, and that the MSDF should therefore engage in any such fighting.
His way of thinking is commonsensical. Nobody except for Japanese defense experts and politicians would consider it acceptable for an MSDF vessel to stand by doing nothing if a vessel belonging to the United States, the key ally of Japan, was on the verge of being sunk in front of the MSDF vessel by an enemy assault.
What would happen if an MSDF vessel dared to assist a U.S. warship?
This act cannot be punishable in terms of this country's criminal law.
Article 36 of the Criminal Code stipulates: "An act unavoidably performed to protect the right of oneself or any other person against imminent and unlawful infringement is not punishable."
The phrase "right of oneself or any other person" in this article is significant.
The question, however, is whether the act of the MSDF ship should be considered a violation of any laws or regulations relating to the Self-Defense Forces.
Any punitive measure taken against the commander of the ship by the government would have to be based on the ban on exercising the right to collective self-defense. But if the issue went to court, the case for the constitutionality of the government ban would surely be weak.
This is because there is no provision at all in the Constitution that explicitly prohibits the exercising of collective self-defense. The ban comes only from an interpretation by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau.
The authority to interpret the Constitution, however, rests in the hands of courts, not of the government. The court has already handed down rulings stating that this country does have the right to self-defense as an inherent right of an independent state.
There is little possibility of the Supreme Court issuing a verdict that would be so pretentious as to back the government's stance, a unique position in the world that divides the concept of self-defense into subcategories--individual self-defense and collective self-defense, and prohibits the exercise of the latter.
If we apply what constitutes legitimate self-defense for an individual citizen to the self-defense of a country, the conclusion we should reach is self-evident when judged through the prism of basic legal philosophy.
All of the hullabaloo over the matter has been preposterous from the very beginning.
In light of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan between the Allied Powers and Japan, which were ratified under the Constitution, Japan has the right to collective self-defense. This right has rooted solidly in its constitutional obligations to abide by international treaties.
In some situations, the government could opt for self-imposed restraint on exercising the right as a matter of political choice. But it is absurd to argue that Japan has the right to collective defense, but nevertheless cannot exercise this right as the standing governmental interpretation asserts.
===
Public understanding deeper
Another factor behind the changing landscape surrounding issues of collective self-defense may be the deepening public understanding in recent years of how important the Japan-U.S. alliance is for this country.
Up until about 30 years ago, it was virtually taboo in Japan even to utter the word "alliance" in public. Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki denied the military dimension of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
But as various opinion surveys in recent years have shown, the perception of the significance of the alliance between Japan and the United States has become firmly rooted in the Japanese public's mind. Indeed, many people now openly say this country should be ready to exercise the right of collective self-defense to help maintain and bolster the Japan-U.S. alliance.
The United States used to refrain from commenting on Japan's constitutional issues, leaving the matter to be decided by the Japanese themselves. But recently, the United States has started speaking out, as shown, for example, by the 2000 Armitage-Nye report and more recently, commentaries by Michael Auslin, a resident scholar with the American Enterprise Institute, a U.S. think tank.
The launch of the U.S. Democratic administration of President Barack Obama has brought back memories of the friction between Tokyo and Washington during the first half of Bill Clinton's administration, highlighting the importance of maintaining and boosting bilateral relations of alliance.
Japan, of course, has sufficient diplomatic muscle to win a verbal reassurance from the United States over its willingness to keep the Japan-U.S. alliance intact.
But if the U.S. side were to ask what Japan would do in exchange for such a reassurance, attention would certainly focus on the issue of Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense. Anything less would merely be a half-measure.
What should Japan do under such circumstances?
The scenario I long had in mind and was trying to achieve was that the government would declare its adoption of a new interpretation on the issue of collective self-defense in the wake of a report by the above-mentioned special advisory panel to the prime minister.
I also envisioned the government would subsequently address the task of gradually revising the laws and regulations, which, due to the current interpretation, have placed the government in a quandary.
But on reading a recent book by former Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata, I felt like I had encountered some fresh thinking.
"I could not help but feel it unnecessary to create the panel [for reviewing collective self-defense matters], and that launching the panel was disrespectful. The prime minister can simply declare that Japan can exercise collective self-defense," Murata writes.
He goes on to say: "The prime minister, while noting that the exercise of the right should be made with the greatest care, should declare that it is up to him to make a final decision on the matter. And if the head of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau takes exception to that, the prime minister will have to seek his resignation, since under the Constitution the prime minister has the power to do that."
Actually, I am a member of the panel Murata referred to as "disrespectful," and I intend to continue working on the procedures the panel is supposed to follow. But should the prime minister decide to issue a declaration as suggested by Murata, I would have no qualms about agreeing with his decision as the best possible solution.
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Getting ready to fight
In making the declaration, it would be important for the prime minister to state clearly that the existing laws and regulations relating to the right of collective self-defense should be revised as quickly as possible.
As mentioned above, there is little possibility of the exercising of the right being ruled illegal by the judiciary.
It is also worth pointing out, though, that a nation's fighting capabilities can hardly be adequate without sufficient training exercises in peacetime. Japan's likelihood to exercise the right in a contingency alone would, in the eyes of the United States, be insufficient in preparing for a joint military operations under the bilateral security pact.
On the assumption that Japan, as a matter of principle, can exercise the right to collective self-defense and that relevant laws can be revised sooner or later, it would be reasonable for the government to allow practice maneuvers presupposing actual law revisions. And if such maneuvers were brought before the court, there is no doubt the Self-Defense Forces members involved would ultimately be found innocent.
I believe the entire issue of collective self-defense already has begun to move toward a resolution. But the most expedient way of accelerating this process will be for Aso to take every opportunity to present his own views on the matter.
The SDF, for their part, should be resolutely prepared to exercise the right to collective self-defense in the event of a crisis and prepare for it through peacetime exercise and maneuvers. Otherwise the Japan-U.S. alliance will hardly be sustainable.
Okazaki served as Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He is currently a guest research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute.
(Jan. 26, 2009)
