2007年12月アーカイブ
Insights into the World
Fukuda should not discourage friends of Japan
Hisahiko Okazaki Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun
Japan's domestic politics has been left in disarray because of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's humiliating defeat in July's House of Councillors election followed by the abrupt resignation in September of Shinzo Abe as prime minister.
What effect are these developments having on the vitally significant relationship between Japan and the United States?
One important trend is the decline of U.S. interest in Japan.
When Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda visited Washington in November, no major U.S. newspaper apart from The Wall Street Journal ran an editorial on his trip. Even then, the focus of the editorial was limited to the need to consider Japanese national sentiments over the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea. As an apparent reflection of waning U.S. interest in Japan, the editorial stopped short of mentioning what Japan's diplomatic strategy toward East Asia should be from a long-range viewpoint.
===
Fukuda a 'consensus builder'
Indicative of the perceptions U.S. intellectuals have about Japan today, especially those well-versed in Japan, is a paper by Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation based in Washington.
Klingner's paper, which was made public a week before Fukuda's visit to Washington, suggested a sense of disappointment at the demise of the Abe administration and its replacement by the Fukuda Cabinet. But it also pointed to the need for Washington not to turn a cold shoulder toward the Fukuda administration, thereby partly defending the new Cabinet and, by extension, Japan as a whole.
"Compared to his predecessor, Fukuda will be less inclined than Abe to press for removing legal restrictions to allow Japan to assume a larger regional security role, a major change in Japanese policy advocated by Washington, but this will not unduly impact the U.S.-Japan relationship," Klingner noted.
He went on to say: "Though some expect drastic policy changes from the reputedly dovish Fukuda, he will likely maintain most of his conservative predecessor's policies, with some adjustments. The most significant will be the reprioritization of Abe's signature issue: pursuing the constitutional and legal revisions necessary for Japan's self-defense forces to assume new missions and for Japan to play a larger security role regionally and internationally. Fukuda...does not share Abe's zeal for using Japan's armed forces as a policy instrument or for forming a 'broader Asia' partnership of democracies--Japan, India, the United States and Australia--to contain China.
"While Fukuda's foreign policy will not be as U.S.-focused as his predecessor's, it would be a mistake to see this as a repudiation of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. Fukuda has vowed to renew the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law which allows Japanese tankers to refuel Coalition naval forces in the Indian Ocean that support operations in Afghanistan.
"Because the opposition Democratic Party of Japan intends to use this legislation to induce a political confrontation with the LDP, Washington runs the risk of needlessly straining the broader relationship with Tokyo. Should that happen, the United States could wind up undermining its long-term objective of having Japan assume a larger security role in northeast Asia as a bulwark against the military threats of North Korea and China."
The paper by Klingner is titled "Japan's Consensus Builder" in reference to Fukuda, and says to the effect that his selection as prime minister should be considered a good choice based on a well-arranged compromise among forces in Japan's ruling camp. It falls short, however, of discussing in detail the specifics of what consensus should be reached in Japan.
It seems Klingner gave his paper this title to cast the Fukuda administration in as favorable a light as possible.
As might be expected from Britain, a country that is never slow to pick up on changes to the international situation, the Financial Times recently carried commentaries about Fukuda over a couple of days.
It said Fukuda "is perceived as less keen than Mr. Abe on expanding Japan's presence in the world's trouble spots, as Washington has wanted."
The Financial Times, however, quickly added that although there are some who are critical of Fukuda's appointment to the premiership as a reversion to the LDP's old-fashioned, backroom-deal-type politics, the important point they have missed in their condemnation "was that, once again, the LDP had hit on just the person to save it."
The viewpoint of the Financial Times regarding the Fukuda administration can be interpreted as similar to Klingner's.
This view seems to represent the limit of what those well-informed about Japan in the United States can say about Japanese-U.S. relations as the situation stands. They are aware that the United States cannot place the same expectations on Japan as it did before. Taking the current East Asian situation into account, they also believe it unadvisable for Washington to act in a way that might disregard or alienate Tokyo.
The long-range policy objective of the United States toward Japan, in their view, is to have Japan play a greater role as a buffer against China and North Korea. They therefore think any move that might be detrimental to achieving this objective should strictly be ruled out and instead call on the Fukuda administration to be viewed favorably.
Looking at the opinion of those sympathetic to Japan, however, may not be enough to grasp the general direction opinions are heading in the United States regarding Japanese-U.S. relations.
Noteworthy in this connection are the policies toward East Asia that two presidential candidates--Hillary Clinton, a Democrat, and John McCain, a Republican--have respectively advocated in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine.
===
Peace, liberty through alliance
Irrespective of who will win the 2008 U.S. presidential election, even if someone other than the two mentioned above wins, it is safe to assume that the opinion of the United States will lie somewhere between the points of view presented by Clinton and McCain.
In her essay, Clinton devoted two paragraphs exclusively to references to China, noting, "Our relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century."
Regarding Japan, Clinton referred only to the need for establishing joint U.S.-Japanese-Chinese programs for combating environmental problems.
McCain, for his part, lauds the cooperation in Afghanistan among U.S. allies, including Japan. He calls for the United States to "go further by linking democratic nations in one organization: a worldwide League of Democracies."
What he advocates is not a Woodrow Wilson-like plan for a universal-membership League of Nations, but something more like the framework Theodore Roosevelt envisioned: like-minded nations working together for peace and liberty.
What brings the ideas of the two into stark contrast is a key concept put forward in a book by Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy," that is, to compare the idea of securing world peace on the basis of balance of power through alliances to a universal, multilateral system of consultations.
Clinton, for that matter, is in favor of the idea of building a Northeast Asia security system based on the framework of the six-party talks for ending North Korea's nuclear programs.
But Japan must guard against this mode of thinking since it raises the danger that an East Asia security arrangement might cause a shift away from the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty toward a multilateral consultation framework.
Both Clinton and McCain support calls for boosting cooperation among Japan, the United States, Australia and India on a broad range of issues. McCain, in particular, stresses the importance of such quadrilateral cooperation as he says the four countries hold basically the same values. He also has made reference to the kind of "arc of freedom and prosperity" stretching across Asia that Taro Aso proposed while in office as foreign minister in the Abe Cabinet.
===
Keep 2 key goals intact
What, then, should Japan do?
Whenever I have asserted the need to strengthen Japan-U.S. security arrangements over the years, a familiar critique is expressed. It goes something like this: It is all right to trust the United States, but how can you be sure the United States reciprocates? Won't the United States eventually choose to stand by China rather than Japan?
This kind of concern is understandable, especially when looking back at events such as the "Nixon shock" of 1971--the surprise announcement that then U.S. President Richard Nixon was seeking rapprochement between Beijing and Washington--or going even further back in time, the events of World War II.
I have made it a rule to respond to this opinion in the following way: I understand this concern very well, but to eliminate it, a choice between two courses of action has to be made. One is to engineer an estrangement between China and the United States and the other is to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. Intentionally scheming to create tension between other parties is not something a respectable person or country would ever do, so the sole remaining solution is to cement the alliance between Japan and the United States.
In terms of a suitable strategy for bolstering the Japan-U.S. alliance, few would object to the idea that, first of all, those U.S. intellectuals sympathetic to Japan should not have their noses put out of joint and should instead be supported and encouraged. Their expectations are clear from what I have discussed above.
The prime minister should take this point into consideration when dealing with two pending matters inherited from the Abe administration. These matters relate to efforts toward expanding Japan's role in the international community: enabling Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense; and boosting cooperation between Japan, the United States, Australia and India.
Given that Fukuda is "just the person" for consensus building as suggested by Klingner and the Financial Times, he is unlikely to be disposed to address these pending tasks aggressively.
At the very least, though, Fukuda should refrain from making remarks that could be interpreted as negative or backpedaling with respect to these two key matters.
Such remarks, if made, would certainly be off-putting for the friends of Japan--those U.S. intellectuals who do show an interest in Japanese matters--and would be the quickest way of encouraging Japan to be viewed with less significance.
Okazaki served as Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He is currently guest research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute.
(Dec. 16, 2007)
Fukuda should not discourage friends of Japan
Hisahiko Okazaki Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun
Japan's domestic politics has been left in disarray because of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's humiliating defeat in July's House of Councillors election followed by the abrupt resignation in September of Shinzo Abe as prime minister.
What effect are these developments having on the vitally significant relationship between Japan and the United States?
One important trend is the decline of U.S. interest in Japan.
When Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda visited Washington in November, no major U.S. newspaper apart from The Wall Street Journal ran an editorial on his trip. Even then, the focus of the editorial was limited to the need to consider Japanese national sentiments over the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea. As an apparent reflection of waning U.S. interest in Japan, the editorial stopped short of mentioning what Japan's diplomatic strategy toward East Asia should be from a long-range viewpoint.
===
Fukuda a 'consensus builder'
Indicative of the perceptions U.S. intellectuals have about Japan today, especially those well-versed in Japan, is a paper by Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation based in Washington.
Klingner's paper, which was made public a week before Fukuda's visit to Washington, suggested a sense of disappointment at the demise of the Abe administration and its replacement by the Fukuda Cabinet. But it also pointed to the need for Washington not to turn a cold shoulder toward the Fukuda administration, thereby partly defending the new Cabinet and, by extension, Japan as a whole.
"Compared to his predecessor, Fukuda will be less inclined than Abe to press for removing legal restrictions to allow Japan to assume a larger regional security role, a major change in Japanese policy advocated by Washington, but this will not unduly impact the U.S.-Japan relationship," Klingner noted.
He went on to say: "Though some expect drastic policy changes from the reputedly dovish Fukuda, he will likely maintain most of his conservative predecessor's policies, with some adjustments. The most significant will be the reprioritization of Abe's signature issue: pursuing the constitutional and legal revisions necessary for Japan's self-defense forces to assume new missions and for Japan to play a larger security role regionally and internationally. Fukuda...does not share Abe's zeal for using Japan's armed forces as a policy instrument or for forming a 'broader Asia' partnership of democracies--Japan, India, the United States and Australia--to contain China.
"While Fukuda's foreign policy will not be as U.S.-focused as his predecessor's, it would be a mistake to see this as a repudiation of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. Fukuda has vowed to renew the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law which allows Japanese tankers to refuel Coalition naval forces in the Indian Ocean that support operations in Afghanistan.
"Because the opposition Democratic Party of Japan intends to use this legislation to induce a political confrontation with the LDP, Washington runs the risk of needlessly straining the broader relationship with Tokyo. Should that happen, the United States could wind up undermining its long-term objective of having Japan assume a larger security role in northeast Asia as a bulwark against the military threats of North Korea and China."
The paper by Klingner is titled "Japan's Consensus Builder" in reference to Fukuda, and says to the effect that his selection as prime minister should be considered a good choice based on a well-arranged compromise among forces in Japan's ruling camp. It falls short, however, of discussing in detail the specifics of what consensus should be reached in Japan.
It seems Klingner gave his paper this title to cast the Fukuda administration in as favorable a light as possible.
As might be expected from Britain, a country that is never slow to pick up on changes to the international situation, the Financial Times recently carried commentaries about Fukuda over a couple of days.
It said Fukuda "is perceived as less keen than Mr. Abe on expanding Japan's presence in the world's trouble spots, as Washington has wanted."
The Financial Times, however, quickly added that although there are some who are critical of Fukuda's appointment to the premiership as a reversion to the LDP's old-fashioned, backroom-deal-type politics, the important point they have missed in their condemnation "was that, once again, the LDP had hit on just the person to save it."
The viewpoint of the Financial Times regarding the Fukuda administration can be interpreted as similar to Klingner's.
This view seems to represent the limit of what those well-informed about Japan in the United States can say about Japanese-U.S. relations as the situation stands. They are aware that the United States cannot place the same expectations on Japan as it did before. Taking the current East Asian situation into account, they also believe it unadvisable for Washington to act in a way that might disregard or alienate Tokyo.
The long-range policy objective of the United States toward Japan, in their view, is to have Japan play a greater role as a buffer against China and North Korea. They therefore think any move that might be detrimental to achieving this objective should strictly be ruled out and instead call on the Fukuda administration to be viewed favorably.
Looking at the opinion of those sympathetic to Japan, however, may not be enough to grasp the general direction opinions are heading in the United States regarding Japanese-U.S. relations.
Noteworthy in this connection are the policies toward East Asia that two presidential candidates--Hillary Clinton, a Democrat, and John McCain, a Republican--have respectively advocated in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine.
===
Peace, liberty through alliance
Irrespective of who will win the 2008 U.S. presidential election, even if someone other than the two mentioned above wins, it is safe to assume that the opinion of the United States will lie somewhere between the points of view presented by Clinton and McCain.
In her essay, Clinton devoted two paragraphs exclusively to references to China, noting, "Our relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century."
Regarding Japan, Clinton referred only to the need for establishing joint U.S.-Japanese-Chinese programs for combating environmental problems.
McCain, for his part, lauds the cooperation in Afghanistan among U.S. allies, including Japan. He calls for the United States to "go further by linking democratic nations in one organization: a worldwide League of Democracies."
What he advocates is not a Woodrow Wilson-like plan for a universal-membership League of Nations, but something more like the framework Theodore Roosevelt envisioned: like-minded nations working together for peace and liberty.
What brings the ideas of the two into stark contrast is a key concept put forward in a book by Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy," that is, to compare the idea of securing world peace on the basis of balance of power through alliances to a universal, multilateral system of consultations.
Clinton, for that matter, is in favor of the idea of building a Northeast Asia security system based on the framework of the six-party talks for ending North Korea's nuclear programs.
But Japan must guard against this mode of thinking since it raises the danger that an East Asia security arrangement might cause a shift away from the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty toward a multilateral consultation framework.
Both Clinton and McCain support calls for boosting cooperation among Japan, the United States, Australia and India on a broad range of issues. McCain, in particular, stresses the importance of such quadrilateral cooperation as he says the four countries hold basically the same values. He also has made reference to the kind of "arc of freedom and prosperity" stretching across Asia that Taro Aso proposed while in office as foreign minister in the Abe Cabinet.
===
Keep 2 key goals intact
What, then, should Japan do?
Whenever I have asserted the need to strengthen Japan-U.S. security arrangements over the years, a familiar critique is expressed. It goes something like this: It is all right to trust the United States, but how can you be sure the United States reciprocates? Won't the United States eventually choose to stand by China rather than Japan?
This kind of concern is understandable, especially when looking back at events such as the "Nixon shock" of 1971--the surprise announcement that then U.S. President Richard Nixon was seeking rapprochement between Beijing and Washington--or going even further back in time, the events of World War II.
I have made it a rule to respond to this opinion in the following way: I understand this concern very well, but to eliminate it, a choice between two courses of action has to be made. One is to engineer an estrangement between China and the United States and the other is to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. Intentionally scheming to create tension between other parties is not something a respectable person or country would ever do, so the sole remaining solution is to cement the alliance between Japan and the United States.
In terms of a suitable strategy for bolstering the Japan-U.S. alliance, few would object to the idea that, first of all, those U.S. intellectuals sympathetic to Japan should not have their noses put out of joint and should instead be supported and encouraged. Their expectations are clear from what I have discussed above.
The prime minister should take this point into consideration when dealing with two pending matters inherited from the Abe administration. These matters relate to efforts toward expanding Japan's role in the international community: enabling Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense; and boosting cooperation between Japan, the United States, Australia and India.
Given that Fukuda is "just the person" for consensus building as suggested by Klingner and the Financial Times, he is unlikely to be disposed to address these pending tasks aggressively.
At the very least, though, Fukuda should refrain from making remarks that could be interpreted as negative or backpedaling with respect to these two key matters.
Such remarks, if made, would certainly be off-putting for the friends of Japan--those U.S. intellectuals who do show an interest in Japanese matters--and would be the quickest way of encouraging Japan to be viewed with less significance.
Okazaki served as Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He is currently guest research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute.
(Dec. 16, 2007)
◇外交評論家
夏の参院選の自民党大敗と９月の安倍内閣退陣後、日本国内政局も混迷しているが、これが日本にとって死活的重要性のある日米関係にどういう影響を与えているのだろうか。
一つの顕著な傾向は米国において日本に対する関心が薄くなったことである。福田首相訪米に際して米主要紙の中で、社説を掲げたのはウォール・ストリート・ジャーナルの１紙だけであり、それも拉致問題に関する日本の国民感情の尊重を訴えただけで、長期的な東アジアの外交戦略の観点から論じたものではなかったということからもわかる。
むしろ、首相訪米の１週間前に、そういう雰囲気を予見して書かれた、ヘリテージ財団（上級研究員）のクリングナー氏の論文が米国の識者、特に知日派の認識と憂慮をよく表明している。
それは、安倍政権から福田政権に代わったことに失望を隠してはいないが、それでも福田政権を冷たく扱ってはいけないと、福田政権、あるいは日本をかばっている論説である。
「安倍氏と比べて福田氏は、米国が望んでいる、日本の役割増大に対する法的制約を除くことに積極的ではないが、このことが日米関係に必要以上の悪影響を与えてはならない」
「ハト派的な福田政権の下で政策の大転換を予想する向きもあったが、福田氏は前任者の保守的アジェンダ（課題）は引き継ぐであろう。ただ、若干の修正は加えよう。例えば、憲法改正とか、中国封じ込めのための日米豪印協力などには前任者ほど熱心ではないであろう」
「福田氏は、前任者ほどアメリカ中心ではないかもしれないが、日米関係を拒否するものではない。現にテロ特措法の延長にコミットしている。テロ特措法の問題は野党がこれを政争の具としているという日本の政治状況によるものなのであるから、その結果がどうなっても日米関係を害してはいけない。そんなことをすると、中国と北朝鮮の脅威から北東アジアの安全を守るために日本により大きな安全保障上の役割を持たせるという長期的目的を傷つけることになる」
そして冒頭に、福田首相を「日本のコンセンサスをつくる人」という表題を付けて、良い妥協的な人選だという趣旨を表明しているが、日本のコンセンサスがどこにあるかというようなことはつめて議論していない。むしろ、福田政権に精いっぱいの好印象を与えるための表題を付けたというべきであろう。
◆集団的自衛権後退は禁物
さすが国際情勢の変化に注意を怠らない英国では、フィナンシャル・タイムズ紙が、２日にわたって解説記事を掲げ、福田首相は安倍前首相に比べアメリカが長く望んできたように日本が世界の問題地域で大きな役割をはたすことには乗り気ではないと分析する一方、自民党が昔の自民党にもどったという嘆きも聞こえるが、この事態を収拾するのに絶好のはまり役を見つけたという点も見逃すべきではない、とクリングナー氏とほぼ同様の観点に立っている。
これが、現状において、米国の知日派が言える限度であろう。いままで通りの期待は持てない。しかし、東アジアの情勢を考えれば、日本を無視し、疎外するようなことをしてはいけない。アメリカの長期的目標は、東アジアにおける中国、北朝鮮に対するバランスとして日本により多くを期待することであり、そのための努力に逆効果となるようなことは厳に戒めて、福田政権を好意的に見守りたい、ということである。
ただ知日派の意見だけではアメリカの思潮の流れはわからない。
参考になるのは、最新のフォーレン・アフェアーズ誌に掲載された、民主、共和両大統領候補ヒラリー、マケイン両氏の論文の中の、それぞれの東アジア政策である。この２人でなくて誰が大統領になっても、アメリカの考え方はこの二つの範囲内であろうと予測して良いからである。
ヒラリー氏の論文は、中国だけについて特に２パラグラフを割き、中国との関係が今世紀における最重要な２国間関係だと言い、日本については日中環境協力に触れているだけである。
マケイン氏は、日本も含めて、アフガニスタンにおける西側同盟国の協力を称賛し、世界的な民主主義の連盟をつくることを提唱している。連盟と言っても、ウィルソン的なものでなく、セオドア・ルーズベルト的な、同じ思考の国々の協力である。この両者を対比するのはキッシンジャーの「外交」における基本的な発想であり、普遍的な多数国間協議機構でなく、同盟と言うバランス・オブ・パワー的発想で平和を守るということである。
まさにこれに対してヒラリー氏は６か国協議のフレームワークの上に北東アジア安全保障制度を築くべきだという構想を支持している。この構想は日本としては、東アジアの安全保障の基礎が日米同盟よりも多数国間協議に重点が移る恐れがあるものとして警戒すべきものである。
ただ、両者とも、日米豪印の協力については支持を表明している。とくにマケイン氏は、同じ価値観を持つ国々の協力であることを強調し、前政権の提案した「自由と繁栄の弧」にも言及している。
さて日本としてはどうすべきであろうか。従来、私が日米同盟推進論を言うと、決まって次の反論が出て来る。「そんなにアメリカばかり頼りにしていても、アメリカの方がいつの間にか中国の方に行ってしまうんじゃないですか？」。１９７１年のニクソン・ショック、更に遡（さかのぼ）って第２次大戦のことを思い出すと無理もない心配である。
これに対して私は常にこう答えている。「ご心配はよく分かります。それを回避する方法は二つに一つしかない。それは米中の仲を裂くか、日米同盟を強化するかだ。他人の仲を裂くのは、まともな人間のすることではない。とすると残る解決策は日米同盟強化しかない」と。
同盟強化の方策の正攻法はまず知日派を挫折させず、勇気付けることであることは誰も異存はないであろう。そして知日派の期待するところは先の論説を見れば明らかである。
現在日本の役割増大に関連する懸案として前内閣から引き継いでいるのは、集団的自衛権の行使と日米豪印の協力である。現首相は、「コンセンサス作り」の「絶好のはまり役」である点で、これを積極的に推進する姿勢でないことはわかる。
ただ、少なくとも、この２点について、否定的、あるいは後ろ向きの発言は控えるべきであろう。それが知日派を挫折させ、日本軽視の方向に向かわせる最も手っ取り早い方法だからである。
【正論】元駐タイ大使 岡崎久彦 台湾名の国連加盟が再浮上？
2007年10月31日 産経新聞 東京朝刊 オピニオン面
■福田政権は中国の牽制に揺らぐな
≪４年前の日本の苦い経験≫
中国にとって、福田内閣の成立は予想もしなかった好展開であり、新内閣成立に対して中国の期待することは多々あろう。
その中で私が当面心配なのは、台湾が「台湾名」で国連加盟申請をすることについての国民投票問題である。台湾の陳水扁総統は来年の総統選挙の際にこの国民投票を併せて行う考えであり、中国は既に猛烈に反対して米国を始めとする各国に働きかけている。
米国は既にスポークスマンを通じて反対を表明し、従来の例から言えば、おそらくは台湾の代表部を通じて反対の意向を伝えているであろう。
中国はＥＵ（欧州連合）に対しても働きかけたがＥＵ側は公式なチャンネルによる反対意見の表明は断ったようである。
日本にも当然に中国より働きかけはあったが、安倍内閣は日本としては特別の措置をとらないこととしてきた。
日本には苦い経験がある。４年前の総統選の際も同様の国民投票が実施された。日本は中国からの圧力で－アメリカからも圧力があったかどうか不明－台湾に申し入れをしてこれを内外に公表した。
これは台湾では全く不評であった。台湾の防衛に責任を持つアメリカが台湾の政策に注文をつけるのはやむを得ないとしても、どうして、台湾の安全に何の貢献もしていない日本が、こんなときにしゃしゃり出るのだということである。そして、その後、台湾において日本を代表する大使の外交活動は退任までの間、麻痺（まひ）状態に陥ったと聞いている。
≪武力行使ほのめかした中国≫
アメリカの反対の表向きの理由は、台湾海峡の緊張を増大させるからだということである。たしかに、先のＡＰＥＣ（アジア太平洋経済協力会議）におけるブッシュ大統領と中国の胡錦濤総書記の会談では、胡錦濤は国民投票そのものに反対し、国家分裂法の発動、すなわち武力の行使まで、ほのめかしたと言う。それが本当ならば確かに台湾海峡の緊張を激化させる。
しかし冷静に考えるとそれは建前で本当の問題は別にあるように思う。
問題点は単純である。もし来春国民投票が行われた場合、中国は武力行使するだろうか。どんな親中国派の人も含めて、いかなる中国専門家に聞いてみても答えは「ノー」であろう。正式な独立宣言でもなく、毎年の加盟申請の名を中華民国から台湾に変えるだけで、オリンピックを控えたこの時期に武力行使をするなどとうてい考えられない。それなら国内事情で胡錦濤がそう言わざるを得ない事情は別として、その真意はなんであろう。
陳水扁側の意図は明らかである。あなたは台湾人か中国人かという世論調査に対して、台湾人という答えが圧倒的に多くなった昨今の台湾で、国連加盟を中国名と台湾名のどちらでするかと聞けば答えは決まっている。それが台湾人意識を再確認させて、選挙で民進党が有利になるという計算である。
どの民主的選挙でも各政党は知恵を絞って戦う。それが合法的である以上とやかく言うことではない。
≪国民党勝たせたいばかりに≫
中国が欲していることは、その逆と考えればよい。次の総統選で国民党を勝たせたいのである。そしてアメリカの反対は民進党にとって不利、国民党にとって有利だから、それを引き出しているのである。
４年前、アメリカと日本が相次いで国民投票反対を公然と申し入れた後、訪日中だった彭明敏資政（総統府上級顧問）は暗い顔で、「もし今度の総統選で陳水扁が負ければそれはアメリカと日本の干渉の故ですよ」と言っていた。そして選挙の結果は薄氷を踏むような僅少（きんしょう）差での民進党の勝利だった。
つまりアメリカは、国民党と民進党の選挙に、国民党の側に立って、選挙干渉をしているのである。武力行使による緊張激化のおそれが全くない以上そういう結論になる。
福田内閣は、いかに中国の圧力があっても、前内閣の今までの方針を転換しないことを期待する。
台湾の人々は、日本に深い親近感と好意を持っている隣人である。その人たちが自分たちの国を、日本と同じように民主的に運営しようとしているのに干渉して、その好意を裏切ることは日本人として堪えがたい。
しかも日本としてはそうする法的道義的理由は全くない。むしろ内政干渉は近代国家間で厳しく禁じられている所である。
中国は台湾を内政問題だと言うかも知れないが、外国に干渉を頼んだこと自体、内政でないことを認めたことになる。（おかざき ひさひこ）
2007年10月31日 産経新聞 東京朝刊 オピニオン面
■福田政権は中国の牽制に揺らぐな
≪４年前の日本の苦い経験≫
中国にとって、福田内閣の成立は予想もしなかった好展開であり、新内閣成立に対して中国の期待することは多々あろう。
その中で私が当面心配なのは、台湾が「台湾名」で国連加盟申請をすることについての国民投票問題である。台湾の陳水扁総統は来年の総統選挙の際にこの国民投票を併せて行う考えであり、中国は既に猛烈に反対して米国を始めとする各国に働きかけている。
米国は既にスポークスマンを通じて反対を表明し、従来の例から言えば、おそらくは台湾の代表部を通じて反対の意向を伝えているであろう。
中国はＥＵ（欧州連合）に対しても働きかけたがＥＵ側は公式なチャンネルによる反対意見の表明は断ったようである。
日本にも当然に中国より働きかけはあったが、安倍内閣は日本としては特別の措置をとらないこととしてきた。
日本には苦い経験がある。４年前の総統選の際も同様の国民投票が実施された。日本は中国からの圧力で－アメリカからも圧力があったかどうか不明－台湾に申し入れをしてこれを内外に公表した。
これは台湾では全く不評であった。台湾の防衛に責任を持つアメリカが台湾の政策に注文をつけるのはやむを得ないとしても、どうして、台湾の安全に何の貢献もしていない日本が、こんなときにしゃしゃり出るのだということである。そして、その後、台湾において日本を代表する大使の外交活動は退任までの間、麻痺（まひ）状態に陥ったと聞いている。
≪武力行使ほのめかした中国≫
アメリカの反対の表向きの理由は、台湾海峡の緊張を増大させるからだということである。たしかに、先のＡＰＥＣ（アジア太平洋経済協力会議）におけるブッシュ大統領と中国の胡錦濤総書記の会談では、胡錦濤は国民投票そのものに反対し、国家分裂法の発動、すなわち武力の行使まで、ほのめかしたと言う。それが本当ならば確かに台湾海峡の緊張を激化させる。
しかし冷静に考えるとそれは建前で本当の問題は別にあるように思う。
問題点は単純である。もし来春国民投票が行われた場合、中国は武力行使するだろうか。どんな親中国派の人も含めて、いかなる中国専門家に聞いてみても答えは「ノー」であろう。正式な独立宣言でもなく、毎年の加盟申請の名を中華民国から台湾に変えるだけで、オリンピックを控えたこの時期に武力行使をするなどとうてい考えられない。それなら国内事情で胡錦濤がそう言わざるを得ない事情は別として、その真意はなんであろう。
陳水扁側の意図は明らかである。あなたは台湾人か中国人かという世論調査に対して、台湾人という答えが圧倒的に多くなった昨今の台湾で、国連加盟を中国名と台湾名のどちらでするかと聞けば答えは決まっている。それが台湾人意識を再確認させて、選挙で民進党が有利になるという計算である。
どの民主的選挙でも各政党は知恵を絞って戦う。それが合法的である以上とやかく言うことではない。
≪国民党勝たせたいばかりに≫
中国が欲していることは、その逆と考えればよい。次の総統選で国民党を勝たせたいのである。そしてアメリカの反対は民進党にとって不利、国民党にとって有利だから、それを引き出しているのである。
４年前、アメリカと日本が相次いで国民投票反対を公然と申し入れた後、訪日中だった彭明敏資政（総統府上級顧問）は暗い顔で、「もし今度の総統選で陳水扁が負ければそれはアメリカと日本の干渉の故ですよ」と言っていた。そして選挙の結果は薄氷を踏むような僅少（きんしょう）差での民進党の勝利だった。
つまりアメリカは、国民党と民進党の選挙に、国民党の側に立って、選挙干渉をしているのである。武力行使による緊張激化のおそれが全くない以上そういう結論になる。
福田内閣は、いかに中国の圧力があっても、前内閣の今までの方針を転換しないことを期待する。
台湾の人々は、日本に深い親近感と好意を持っている隣人である。その人たちが自分たちの国を、日本と同じように民主的に運営しようとしているのに干渉して、その好意を裏切ることは日本人として堪えがたい。
しかも日本としてはそうする法的道義的理由は全くない。むしろ内政干渉は近代国家間で厳しく禁じられている所である。
中国は台湾を内政問題だと言うかも知れないが、外国に干渉を頼んだこと自体、内政でないことを認めたことになる。（おかざき ひさひこ）
It's Taiwan's referendum
Friday, Nov. 23, 2007
By HISAHIKO OKAZAKI
For China, the launch of the Fukuda Cabinet in late September was good news, so it must expect many things from the new administration. What concerns me now in this respect is Taiwan's move to hold a national referendum on whether to seek U.N. membership in the name of "Taiwan."
Taiwanese President Chen Shui—bian wants to hold this referendum during next year's presidential election. China, which vehemently opposes the move, has tried to persuade various countries, including the United States, to stop it. The U.S. has publicly expressed its opposition to the referendum through a spokesman. And it is likely that Washington has already conveyed that position through its representative office in Taiwan. China has similarly approached the European Union, but the EU appears to have refused to express an opposing view through official channels.
As expected, China has also tried to influence Japanese policy. The position of the previous administration of Shinzo Abe was that Tokyo should not take any definitive action — for a good reason.
Four years ago, when Taiwan held a similar referendum at the time of the presidential election, Tokyo publicly conveyed its opposition to Taipei, evidently under pressure from Beijing (whether Japan came under pressure from the U.S. as well is unclear). That action badly hurt popular sentiments toward the Japanese. The reaction there was: Why is Japan meddling in the affairs of Taiwan while making no contributions to the island's security?
On the other hand, America was let off the hook for trying to influence Taiwanese policy because it was responsible for the defense of the island. As a result of the Japanese action, the envoy who represented Japan in Taiwan at the time became virtually unable, I am told, to conduct diplomatic activities there until he retired from the post.
Ostensibly, America's reason for opposing the referendum is that it would intensify tensions across the Taiwan Strait. In fact, at a U.S.—China summit on the sidelines of the last Asia—Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Chinese President Hu Jintao reportedly told U.S. President George W. Bush that China was opposed to the referendum itself, and even hinted that China might invoke the national anti-secession law, which means military action. That would certainly intensify cross—strait tensions. The veiled threat, though, is largely rhetorical. Calm judgment suggests that the real problem lies elsewhere.
The question at stake is rather simple. If a referendum is actually held next spring, will China use military force? The answer, if put to all schools of China experts including pro-China ones, invariably would be "no."
With China hosting the next Olympics, it is simply inconceivable for that country to resort to force if Taiwan, instead of making a formal declaration of independence, just changed its name from the Republic of China to Taiwan in its annual membership application to the United Nations. If so, then what compelled Hu to drop the dark hint, and what is his real motive?
To Chen and his supporters, the purpose of the referendum is clear: Having voters reaffirm their Taiwanese identity and thereby bring electoral gains to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In opinion polls asking "Do you consider yourself Taiwanese or Chinese?," an overwhelming majority say Taiwanese. So it is a foregone conclusion that most people will prefer the name of "Taiwan," not China, in its application for U.N. membership.
In democratic elections everywhere, political parties devise their own methods for campaigns. As long as the campaigns are lawfully carried out, outsiders should stay on the sidelines.
What China wants to see may well be the opposite of what the DPP wants to achieve. Beijing wants the Nationalist Party (KMT) to win in the next presidential election, so it is trying indirectly to promote the KMT, because U.S. opposition to the referendum hurts the Democratic Progressives while helping the Nationalists.
What happened four years ago comes to mind. Following public protests of the referendum from both the U.S. and Japan, Peng Ming-min, senior adviser to the Taiwanese president, told me during a visit here, "If Chen Shui—bian loses in the presidential election, it will be because of interference from America and Japan." It turned out that the DPP won a razor-thin majority.
In effect, the U.S. was, and is, interfering in Taiwan's elections between the KMT and the DPP in ways that favor the former. This seems to be the inevitable conclusion given that the possibility of tensions escalating through the use of force is virtually nil.
For the Fukuda administration, the right course to follow is to stick with the policy of the previous administration, no matter what China says or does.
The people of Taiwan are our neighbors who have a deep affinity and close feelings of good will toward Japan. At a time when they are trying to run their country as democratically as Japan, it is unconscionable for the Japanese to betray these feelings. Moreover, Japan has no legal or moral reasons for doing so. After all, interference in the internal affairs of other countries is strictly prohibited among modern states.
China may say that Taiwan represents its internal affair, but by asking foreign countries to interfere, China is tacitly admitting that Taiwan is more than just an internal affair.
Hisahiko Okazaki is a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. The original Japanese version of this article appeared in the Oct. 31 Seiron column of Sankei Shimbun.
Friday, Nov. 23, 2007
By HISAHIKO OKAZAKI
For China, the launch of the Fukuda Cabinet in late September was good news, so it must expect many things from the new administration. What concerns me now in this respect is Taiwan's move to hold a national referendum on whether to seek U.N. membership in the name of "Taiwan."
Taiwanese President Chen Shui—bian wants to hold this referendum during next year's presidential election. China, which vehemently opposes the move, has tried to persuade various countries, including the United States, to stop it. The U.S. has publicly expressed its opposition to the referendum through a spokesman. And it is likely that Washington has already conveyed that position through its representative office in Taiwan. China has similarly approached the European Union, but the EU appears to have refused to express an opposing view through official channels.
As expected, China has also tried to influence Japanese policy. The position of the previous administration of Shinzo Abe was that Tokyo should not take any definitive action — for a good reason.
Four years ago, when Taiwan held a similar referendum at the time of the presidential election, Tokyo publicly conveyed its opposition to Taipei, evidently under pressure from Beijing (whether Japan came under pressure from the U.S. as well is unclear). That action badly hurt popular sentiments toward the Japanese. The reaction there was: Why is Japan meddling in the affairs of Taiwan while making no contributions to the island's security?
On the other hand, America was let off the hook for trying to influence Taiwanese policy because it was responsible for the defense of the island. As a result of the Japanese action, the envoy who represented Japan in Taiwan at the time became virtually unable, I am told, to conduct diplomatic activities there until he retired from the post.
Ostensibly, America's reason for opposing the referendum is that it would intensify tensions across the Taiwan Strait. In fact, at a U.S.—China summit on the sidelines of the last Asia—Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Chinese President Hu Jintao reportedly told U.S. President George W. Bush that China was opposed to the referendum itself, and even hinted that China might invoke the national anti-secession law, which means military action. That would certainly intensify cross—strait tensions. The veiled threat, though, is largely rhetorical. Calm judgment suggests that the real problem lies elsewhere.
The question at stake is rather simple. If a referendum is actually held next spring, will China use military force? The answer, if put to all schools of China experts including pro-China ones, invariably would be "no."
With China hosting the next Olympics, it is simply inconceivable for that country to resort to force if Taiwan, instead of making a formal declaration of independence, just changed its name from the Republic of China to Taiwan in its annual membership application to the United Nations. If so, then what compelled Hu to drop the dark hint, and what is his real motive?
To Chen and his supporters, the purpose of the referendum is clear: Having voters reaffirm their Taiwanese identity and thereby bring electoral gains to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In opinion polls asking "Do you consider yourself Taiwanese or Chinese?," an overwhelming majority say Taiwanese. So it is a foregone conclusion that most people will prefer the name of "Taiwan," not China, in its application for U.N. membership.
In democratic elections everywhere, political parties devise their own methods for campaigns. As long as the campaigns are lawfully carried out, outsiders should stay on the sidelines.
What China wants to see may well be the opposite of what the DPP wants to achieve. Beijing wants the Nationalist Party (KMT) to win in the next presidential election, so it is trying indirectly to promote the KMT, because U.S. opposition to the referendum hurts the Democratic Progressives while helping the Nationalists.
What happened four years ago comes to mind. Following public protests of the referendum from both the U.S. and Japan, Peng Ming-min, senior adviser to the Taiwanese president, told me during a visit here, "If Chen Shui—bian loses in the presidential election, it will be because of interference from America and Japan." It turned out that the DPP won a razor-thin majority.
In effect, the U.S. was, and is, interfering in Taiwan's elections between the KMT and the DPP in ways that favor the former. This seems to be the inevitable conclusion given that the possibility of tensions escalating through the use of force is virtually nil.
For the Fukuda administration, the right course to follow is to stick with the policy of the previous administration, no matter what China says or does.
The people of Taiwan are our neighbors who have a deep affinity and close feelings of good will toward Japan. At a time when they are trying to run their country as democratically as Japan, it is unconscionable for the Japanese to betray these feelings. Moreover, Japan has no legal or moral reasons for doing so. After all, interference in the internal affairs of other countries is strictly prohibited among modern states.
China may say that Taiwan represents its internal affair, but by asking foreign countries to interfere, China is tacitly admitting that Taiwan is more than just an internal affair.
Hisahiko Okazaki is a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. The original Japanese version of this article appeared in the Oct. 31 Seiron column of Sankei Shimbun.
