2007年6月アーカイブ
By Hisahiko Okazaki
Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun
Arguing about generational differences can result in misunderstandings for all concerned. Everyone differs in terms of time and place of birth and upbringing, as well as ways of thinking and beliefs. To be sure, people may take offense if they are categorized simply by generational criteria.
Therefore, when you to read the following, understand that any discussion about generational characteristics is nothing more than a sketchy generalization, as people are people and you are you.
Also, as is usual with me, I have no intention of insisting on the intellectual property rights of what I write, so feel free to make use of my views as a basis for further fact-finding.
Even in the process of preparing a draft for this article, I learned many things that were new to me whenever I discussed my view with friends.
Previously, for instance, I vaguely believed that education before World War II influenced by leftist ideological prejudices might have returned to normal in stages from around the time of the protests in 1970 over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
Later, I was informed that many of the youths who protested in 1970 against the renewal of the Japan-U.S. pact subsequently were hard put to find employment, having little option other than to become schoolteachers. In the 1980s--when they had become accustomed to teaching and a new strain of history education on the basis of a self-tormenting view of the nation's wartime past began to be prevalent--I learned that education at primary and middle schools had slanted further to the left than before. ===
Leftist slant in the '80s
Classifying generations in 2007, the 19th year of the Heisei era, can roughly be done as follows:
The first is the generation born in the Meiji (1868-1912) era, those aged 95 or older.
Many of that generation who are still alive were 20 years old in 1932, the year following the Manchurian Incident, meaning that they were educated before the advent of the age of militarism.
In their youth, noted figures of the Meiji era had already died, and they were brought up immersed in the surge of the liberal atmosphere of the Taisho Democracy, the good old days.
At the time of the outbreak of war in the Pacific Theater of World War II, they were 30 or older, or the generation to which midlevel war leaders belonged. Those at the top echelons who led the war effort have already died.
The next is the generation born in the Taisho (1912-1926) era, who are now between 81 and 95.
Although they have been brought up blessed with the nation's wholesome educational and cultural traditions, they later constituted the generation of military servicemen, since the youngest of those conscripted were people born in 1926, the 15th year of the Taisho era.
Their experiences in the service varied depending on whether they were members of the military elite. Their views of the war also vary, as the younger people in that age bracket had experiences that were more bitter because of their low ranks in the closing days of the war.
The Taisho-era generation is followed by those born during the first to ninth years of the Showa era, and are now 73 to 81 years old. They are known as the single-digit Showa generation.
They were educated in the prewar period, before the end of their high school days or at least until the end of primary school.
Many figures from this generation are still active in the political and business world as well as in journalism and other fields, since many highly talented people of the generation who preceded them were killed in the war.
Among the older half of the 73-81 age group are some who yearn for their high school days during the prewar education system, as was the case with those born in the Meiji and Taisho eras.
The classification up to this point is quite familiar.
People who were born during the following 15-year period, and now aged 57 to 72, can be lumped by my classification as the first postwar education generation, because their childhood and youth coincided with the launch of the postwar education system.
This generation was strongly influenced not only by the postwar education regimen, but also by the postwar mass media, under the sway of Marxism and antiwar, pacifist tenets.
I think it adequate to define 57-year-olds as the youngest in this age bracket, since the subsequent generation saw the cessation of campus turmoil when they entered university, and their college life was more or less lethargic.
My classification is based on the assumption that people who were at university during the period spanning the two rounds of student turmoil over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 and 1970 can be grouped as the generation of Zengakuren (national federation of students' self-government associations) and Zenkyoto (all-campus joint struggle committees). Some may well object, however, that the 1960 student protests against the security pact should be considered one thing and those in 1970 another.
The view that those who spent their university days at the time of the 1970 anti-security treaty movements be considered a separate generation may also be reasonable, since they comprise the postwar baby boomers.
On the heels of the baby-boom generation is the age group from about 40 to 56, which in my classification should be called juniors of the prewar education generation.
When they enrolled at universities, university life was in the political doldrums, a vacuum in terms of student interest in politics.
However, it does not mean this group was bereft of any thought: They must have been influenced by parents and schoolteachers, among others.
Characteristic of this generation is that their parents, or at least one of them, were of the generation that was the last among those who were educated in the prewar days. This is why I opt for distinguishing the juniors of the prewar education generation from the ensuing generation, or people, both who and whose parents had their school days entirely under the postwar education system.
In this generation are many who have just begun to steer today's Japan, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Incidentally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, born in 1954, and French President Nicholas Sarkozy, born in 1956, belong to the same generation and attended university after the movements against the Vietnam War and Charles De Gaulle. All three of these leaders are characterized as more conservative and pro-American compared with the preceding generation.
Coming next is the category comprising the age group from about 25 to 40.
This bracket includes what in Japan is demographically called the second baby-boom generation.
People in this generation and their parents have no links at all to prewar education, and they, by my generational definition, may tentatively be called the second postwar education generation.
Notably, they were raised when the ideologically prejudiced postwar education system was being phased out. As a result, there were considerable differences in the quality of education received, depending on schools and classes, which resulted in this generation's relatively wide diversification of personal characteristics.
People in this generation were born in the period from the latter half of the 1960s to the 1970s. ===
Age of Horiemon
Those who were born in and after 1970 attended middle and high schools from the period from around 1985 to 2000, when the self-torturing way of viewing the nation's wartime past was at its height. That period was also at the zenith of the bubble economy, the time all generations were able to experience of material affluence, under which anybody, irrespective of income levels, was said to be optimistic enough to enjoy such pleasures as family trips every weekend.
People in the 25-40 generation, as well as their parents, are completely removed from the prewar education system, brought up in an age of material affluence. This generation's education reportedly tended to place priority on individual skills and agility rather than cultivating personality, thus paving the way for nurturing figures keen on outright moneymaking, such as Livedoor founder Takafumi Horie, popularly known as Horiemon.
Noteworthy in this connection is that while the first postwar education generation has been molded into that era's mode of thinking, many belonging to the second postwar education generation are said to have attained a certain degree of flexibility and readiness to change their minds and consider conflicting opinions.
Those of this generation born in and after 1970 are split into two groups, depending on whether the time they graduated from school and found employment was during or subsequent to the bubble era.
The remaining chunk in this exercise of generational distinctions consists of those in their mid-20s or younger.
They can be said to be a generation new to and different from the rest of the population, in that they were educated when the leftist, self-torturing views of the nation's wartime past were on the wane and graduated from university at the time the national economy began to pick up. They now live in a time when the virtues of the Japanese state are embraced as a subject of discussion. Such current topics as the "dignity of the state" and "Japan, a beautiful country" can be understood as manifestations of motivation for restoring national pride.
Hopes should be placed on the future roles of those in their mid-20s or younger, a new generation not self-absorbed with such things as high economic growth or bubbles but instead motivated by confidence in the nation-state. ===
Postwar remnants die hard
People aged 20 or younger, however, have been brought up under the so-called cram-free education. The content of school textbooks for them was substantially watered down, which is said to have resulted in problematic knowledge and competence.
Cram-free education, too, is a product influenced by postwar, left-wing thinking.
As there is no telling about how long the remnants of this mind-set will linger, I cannot help but be keen to see these negative postwar vestiges ended as early as possible.
What I have discussed here is nothing more than a preliminary attempt that, if a bit more elaborately explored, might prove useful for the purpose of analyzing national political trends.
For example, analyses based on opinion polls today--distinguishing age brackets not by generational categories but at 10-year intervals--seem to indicate a conservative voting pattern of those I have classified as juniors of the prewar education generation, compared with prior and posterior generations.
Okazaki served as Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He is currently guest research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute.
Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun
Arguing about generational differences can result in misunderstandings for all concerned. Everyone differs in terms of time and place of birth and upbringing, as well as ways of thinking and beliefs. To be sure, people may take offense if they are categorized simply by generational criteria.
Therefore, when you to read the following, understand that any discussion about generational characteristics is nothing more than a sketchy generalization, as people are people and you are you.
Also, as is usual with me, I have no intention of insisting on the intellectual property rights of what I write, so feel free to make use of my views as a basis for further fact-finding.
Even in the process of preparing a draft for this article, I learned many things that were new to me whenever I discussed my view with friends.
Previously, for instance, I vaguely believed that education before World War II influenced by leftist ideological prejudices might have returned to normal in stages from around the time of the protests in 1970 over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
Later, I was informed that many of the youths who protested in 1970 against the renewal of the Japan-U.S. pact subsequently were hard put to find employment, having little option other than to become schoolteachers. In the 1980s--when they had become accustomed to teaching and a new strain of history education on the basis of a self-tormenting view of the nation's wartime past began to be prevalent--I learned that education at primary and middle schools had slanted further to the left than before. ===
Leftist slant in the '80s
Classifying generations in 2007, the 19th year of the Heisei era, can roughly be done as follows:
The first is the generation born in the Meiji (1868-1912) era, those aged 95 or older.
Many of that generation who are still alive were 20 years old in 1932, the year following the Manchurian Incident, meaning that they were educated before the advent of the age of militarism.
In their youth, noted figures of the Meiji era had already died, and they were brought up immersed in the surge of the liberal atmosphere of the Taisho Democracy, the good old days.
At the time of the outbreak of war in the Pacific Theater of World War II, they were 30 or older, or the generation to which midlevel war leaders belonged. Those at the top echelons who led the war effort have already died.
The next is the generation born in the Taisho (1912-1926) era, who are now between 81 and 95.
Although they have been brought up blessed with the nation's wholesome educational and cultural traditions, they later constituted the generation of military servicemen, since the youngest of those conscripted were people born in 1926, the 15th year of the Taisho era.
Their experiences in the service varied depending on whether they were members of the military elite. Their views of the war also vary, as the younger people in that age bracket had experiences that were more bitter because of their low ranks in the closing days of the war.
The Taisho-era generation is followed by those born during the first to ninth years of the Showa era, and are now 73 to 81 years old. They are known as the single-digit Showa generation.
They were educated in the prewar period, before the end of their high school days or at least until the end of primary school.
Many figures from this generation are still active in the political and business world as well as in journalism and other fields, since many highly talented people of the generation who preceded them were killed in the war.
Among the older half of the 73-81 age group are some who yearn for their high school days during the prewar education system, as was the case with those born in the Meiji and Taisho eras.
The classification up to this point is quite familiar.
People who were born during the following 15-year period, and now aged 57 to 72, can be lumped by my classification as the first postwar education generation, because their childhood and youth coincided with the launch of the postwar education system.
This generation was strongly influenced not only by the postwar education regimen, but also by the postwar mass media, under the sway of Marxism and antiwar, pacifist tenets.
I think it adequate to define 57-year-olds as the youngest in this age bracket, since the subsequent generation saw the cessation of campus turmoil when they entered university, and their college life was more or less lethargic.
My classification is based on the assumption that people who were at university during the period spanning the two rounds of student turmoil over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 and 1970 can be grouped as the generation of Zengakuren (national federation of students' self-government associations) and Zenkyoto (all-campus joint struggle committees). Some may well object, however, that the 1960 student protests against the security pact should be considered one thing and those in 1970 another.
The view that those who spent their university days at the time of the 1970 anti-security treaty movements be considered a separate generation may also be reasonable, since they comprise the postwar baby boomers.
On the heels of the baby-boom generation is the age group from about 40 to 56, which in my classification should be called juniors of the prewar education generation.
When they enrolled at universities, university life was in the political doldrums, a vacuum in terms of student interest in politics.
However, it does not mean this group was bereft of any thought: They must have been influenced by parents and schoolteachers, among others.
Characteristic of this generation is that their parents, or at least one of them, were of the generation that was the last among those who were educated in the prewar days. This is why I opt for distinguishing the juniors of the prewar education generation from the ensuing generation, or people, both who and whose parents had their school days entirely under the postwar education system.
In this generation are many who have just begun to steer today's Japan, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Incidentally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, born in 1954, and French President Nicholas Sarkozy, born in 1956, belong to the same generation and attended university after the movements against the Vietnam War and Charles De Gaulle. All three of these leaders are characterized as more conservative and pro-American compared with the preceding generation.
Coming next is the category comprising the age group from about 25 to 40.
This bracket includes what in Japan is demographically called the second baby-boom generation.
People in this generation and their parents have no links at all to prewar education, and they, by my generational definition, may tentatively be called the second postwar education generation.
Notably, they were raised when the ideologically prejudiced postwar education system was being phased out. As a result, there were considerable differences in the quality of education received, depending on schools and classes, which resulted in this generation's relatively wide diversification of personal characteristics.
People in this generation were born in the period from the latter half of the 1960s to the 1970s. ===
Age of Horiemon
Those who were born in and after 1970 attended middle and high schools from the period from around 1985 to 2000, when the self-torturing way of viewing the nation's wartime past was at its height. That period was also at the zenith of the bubble economy, the time all generations were able to experience of material affluence, under which anybody, irrespective of income levels, was said to be optimistic enough to enjoy such pleasures as family trips every weekend.
People in the 25-40 generation, as well as their parents, are completely removed from the prewar education system, brought up in an age of material affluence. This generation's education reportedly tended to place priority on individual skills and agility rather than cultivating personality, thus paving the way for nurturing figures keen on outright moneymaking, such as Livedoor founder Takafumi Horie, popularly known as Horiemon.
Noteworthy in this connection is that while the first postwar education generation has been molded into that era's mode of thinking, many belonging to the second postwar education generation are said to have attained a certain degree of flexibility and readiness to change their minds and consider conflicting opinions.
Those of this generation born in and after 1970 are split into two groups, depending on whether the time they graduated from school and found employment was during or subsequent to the bubble era.
The remaining chunk in this exercise of generational distinctions consists of those in their mid-20s or younger.
They can be said to be a generation new to and different from the rest of the population, in that they were educated when the leftist, self-torturing views of the nation's wartime past were on the wane and graduated from university at the time the national economy began to pick up. They now live in a time when the virtues of the Japanese state are embraced as a subject of discussion. Such current topics as the "dignity of the state" and "Japan, a beautiful country" can be understood as manifestations of motivation for restoring national pride.
Hopes should be placed on the future roles of those in their mid-20s or younger, a new generation not self-absorbed with such things as high economic growth or bubbles but instead motivated by confidence in the nation-state. ===
Postwar remnants die hard
People aged 20 or younger, however, have been brought up under the so-called cram-free education. The content of school textbooks for them was substantially watered down, which is said to have resulted in problematic knowledge and competence.
Cram-free education, too, is a product influenced by postwar, left-wing thinking.
As there is no telling about how long the remnants of this mind-set will linger, I cannot help but be keen to see these negative postwar vestiges ended as early as possible.
What I have discussed here is nothing more than a preliminary attempt that, if a bit more elaborately explored, might prove useful for the purpose of analyzing national political trends.
For example, analyses based on opinion polls today--distinguishing age brackets not by generational categories but at 10-year intervals--seem to indicate a conservative voting pattern of those I have classified as juniors of the prewar education generation, compared with prior and posterior generations.
Okazaki served as Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He is currently guest research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute.
◇外交評論家
◆戦前・戦後教育が交錯
世代論というのは往々礼を失することになる。人間は、一人ひとり、生まれも育ちも、個人の思想も異なる。それを十把ひとからげにして、世代別に分類するのだから失礼な話である。だから、この論文をお読みになる方は、世代論は一般論として、自分は自分、自分は別と思って読んでいただきたい。
また、私は従来知的所有権は主張しない方針なので、どなたかがこれを叩（たた）き台にして、更に聞き取り調査をして、修正版を作られることに何の異存もない。現に草案の段階でも私のアイデアをひとに話すごとに私の知らない新しいことが分かって来た。
たとえば、７０年安保を境として偏向教育がだんだんと収まったと漠然と思っていたが、７０年安保闘争を経験した若者の多くが、他の職が困難で、教職につき、それが実力を持った８０年代に、当時新たに始まった自虐史観教育の影響もあり、小中学の教育がそれまでより左傾した現象もあったとも聞いた。
平成１９年、即（すなわ）ち２００７年時点で大雑把に世代を分けてみると次のとおりとなる。
まずは明治生まれの戦前世代であり、９４歳以上である。２０歳の時が、満州事変の翌年１９３２年であるので、軍国主義時代の前に教育が終わった人々である。明治生まれと言っても、昔の明治人の時代はもう終わっていて、大正デモクラシーにどっぷり浸（つ）かっていた、古き良き時代の人々である。
また、開戦のときは３０歳以上であり、戦争指導の中堅幹部だった世代である。その上の、戦争の大局を指導した高級幹部の世代はもう生きていない。
次は、８１歳から９４歳までの大正生まれの世代である。日本の伝統教育、教養の中でしっかりと育った世代であるが、召集令状が来たのは大正１５年生まれまでであるから、ちょうど兵隊の世代である。その軍隊体験は、軍の中のエリートであったかどうかで異なり、また、その意味で、年齢が下ほど、戦争末期の敗戦時に、下級軍人として苦労した辛（つら）い経験がその戦争感に影響してくる。
次が、現在７３歳から８１歳までの昭和一桁（けた）生まれの世代である。少なくとも、小学校卒業、あるいは、高等学校までは、戦前教育を受けた世代である。
上の世代に戦争の空白があり、多くの逸材が失われたので、この世代には今でも政財界、言論界などで活躍している人が多い。また、この世代の半ばから上は、大正、明治生まれの人と同様に、いわゆる旧制高校時代を懐かしむ人もいる世代である。ここまでが私が肌でわかる世代区分である。
その後、１５年間、５７歳から７２歳までを、物心付いた頃（ころ）以降戦後教育を受けた世代として、戦後教育第一世代としてくくってみた。それは学校教育だけに限らず、マルキシズム、反戦平和主義の戦後マスコミの影響を濃く受けた世代である。
終わりを５７歳で切ったのは、その直後の世代が大学に入った頃はもう大学紛争は終わって一応無風状態になったからである。
つまり、大学時代を６０年安保、７０年安保闘争で過ごした全学連、全共闘世代と考えてくくったのであるが、６０年安保と７０年安保では違うという人もいる。また７０年安保世代がちょうど戦後のベイビーブームによるいわゆる団塊の世代と重なるので、これを別に区分する考え方もあり得よう。
その直後は、４０歳前後から５６歳までで、私は、戦前教育の第二世代と呼んでいる。大学に入った時は政治的に無風時代であり、一種の空白が生じた時代であるが、思想に空白と言うことはあり得ない。家庭や教師の影響はある。そして、この世代の特徴は両親の少なくとも片方は戦前教育を受けた最後の世代であるということである。その意味で、その直後の、親も子も戦後教育しか知らない世代と区別したのである。ただ、親の年には幅があるので、下限を４０歳前後とした。
この世代に、安倍総理を含む、今後の日本を背負う人々が多くいる。
ちなみに、ドイツのメルケル首相は安倍総理と同い年、サルコジ大統領は、一歳下である。ヨーロッパでも、いわゆる六八年世代が、大学で、ベトナム反戦、反ド・ゴールに荒れ狂ったが、その終息後の新しい世代であり、より保守的、親米的である。
その次は４０歳前後から２０代半ばまで、人口動態で言う団塊第二世代を含む世代であり、親も子も戦前教育から断絶した世代として、試みに戦後教育第二世代と呼ぶ。他方戦後の偏向教育もそろそろ衰退の過程にあった時代に育ち、学校により教室によりバラつきがあり、個人の差が大きい。
生まれは１９６０年代後半から７０年代であるが、７０年生まれ以降は自虐史観絶頂期の１９８５～２０００年の頃に中高教育を受けている。またその期間はまさにバブル絶頂の時代であり、全世代が、バブル時代の物質的享楽の経験がある。誰もが楽観的で、金があろうと無かろうと、週末ごとに家族旅行などを楽しんだ時代だという。
親も子も戦前教育から断絶し、しかも物質的享楽を得た時代であり、学校でも、人格よりも能力が重んじられる風潮があったと聞く。まさにホリエモンの時代である。
ただ、戦後教育第一世代は、戦後思想で固まっているが、この第二世代となると、話すと「ああ、そうか」と考え直す柔軟性があると言う。
その中でも、さらに、１９７０年生まれを境として、大学卒業、就職時にバブル期だったか、日本が自信を失ったバブル崩壊後だったかの二つの世代に分かれる。
その後は、２０代前半以下である。左翼史観、自虐史観の全面的な衰退期に教育を受け、大学卒業時に経済回復期に巡り合った新しい世代である。日本という国の良さも論じられる時代になった。国家の品格といい、美しい国というのもその余裕の表れである。もはや高度成長やバブルで浮ついていない一方、日本という国家、民族について自信を回復した新しい世代と考えて、将来に期待したい。
ただ、そのまた下２０歳以下には、ゆとり教育で薄っぺらな教科書で育った世代があり、その知識、能力には問題があるという。ゆとり教育も戦後左翼思想の影響である。いつまで戦後が続くのであろうか、もうこれで終止符を打って欲しいと思う。
以上全くの試論であるが、これをもう少し精緻（せいち）に仕上げれば、政治動向分析にも使えるかもしれない。
一例として、今の世論調査分析は１０年ごとに区切っていて、世代論による区分ではないが、それでも、戦前教育第二世代頃の年代の投票傾向は、その前と後の世代より保守的であったことを示す調査結果もあるらしい。
◇岡崎久彦氏＝１９３０年、中国大連生まれ。駐米公使、駐サウジアラビア、駐タイ大使などを歴任。現在、岡崎研究所長。
写真＝岡崎久彦氏
◆戦前・戦後教育が交錯
世代論というのは往々礼を失することになる。人間は、一人ひとり、生まれも育ちも、個人の思想も異なる。それを十把ひとからげにして、世代別に分類するのだから失礼な話である。だから、この論文をお読みになる方は、世代論は一般論として、自分は自分、自分は別と思って読んでいただきたい。
また、私は従来知的所有権は主張しない方針なので、どなたかがこれを叩（たた）き台にして、更に聞き取り調査をして、修正版を作られることに何の異存もない。現に草案の段階でも私のアイデアをひとに話すごとに私の知らない新しいことが分かって来た。
たとえば、７０年安保を境として偏向教育がだんだんと収まったと漠然と思っていたが、７０年安保闘争を経験した若者の多くが、他の職が困難で、教職につき、それが実力を持った８０年代に、当時新たに始まった自虐史観教育の影響もあり、小中学の教育がそれまでより左傾した現象もあったとも聞いた。
平成１９年、即（すなわ）ち２００７年時点で大雑把に世代を分けてみると次のとおりとなる。
まずは明治生まれの戦前世代であり、９４歳以上である。２０歳の時が、満州事変の翌年１９３２年であるので、軍国主義時代の前に教育が終わった人々である。明治生まれと言っても、昔の明治人の時代はもう終わっていて、大正デモクラシーにどっぷり浸（つ）かっていた、古き良き時代の人々である。
また、開戦のときは３０歳以上であり、戦争指導の中堅幹部だった世代である。その上の、戦争の大局を指導した高級幹部の世代はもう生きていない。
次は、８１歳から９４歳までの大正生まれの世代である。日本の伝統教育、教養の中でしっかりと育った世代であるが、召集令状が来たのは大正１５年生まれまでであるから、ちょうど兵隊の世代である。その軍隊体験は、軍の中のエリートであったかどうかで異なり、また、その意味で、年齢が下ほど、戦争末期の敗戦時に、下級軍人として苦労した辛（つら）い経験がその戦争感に影響してくる。
次が、現在７３歳から８１歳までの昭和一桁（けた）生まれの世代である。少なくとも、小学校卒業、あるいは、高等学校までは、戦前教育を受けた世代である。
上の世代に戦争の空白があり、多くの逸材が失われたので、この世代には今でも政財界、言論界などで活躍している人が多い。また、この世代の半ばから上は、大正、明治生まれの人と同様に、いわゆる旧制高校時代を懐かしむ人もいる世代である。ここまでが私が肌でわかる世代区分である。
その後、１５年間、５７歳から７２歳までを、物心付いた頃（ころ）以降戦後教育を受けた世代として、戦後教育第一世代としてくくってみた。それは学校教育だけに限らず、マルキシズム、反戦平和主義の戦後マスコミの影響を濃く受けた世代である。
終わりを５７歳で切ったのは、その直後の世代が大学に入った頃はもう大学紛争は終わって一応無風状態になったからである。
つまり、大学時代を６０年安保、７０年安保闘争で過ごした全学連、全共闘世代と考えてくくったのであるが、６０年安保と７０年安保では違うという人もいる。また７０年安保世代がちょうど戦後のベイビーブームによるいわゆる団塊の世代と重なるので、これを別に区分する考え方もあり得よう。
その直後は、４０歳前後から５６歳までで、私は、戦前教育の第二世代と呼んでいる。大学に入った時は政治的に無風時代であり、一種の空白が生じた時代であるが、思想に空白と言うことはあり得ない。家庭や教師の影響はある。そして、この世代の特徴は両親の少なくとも片方は戦前教育を受けた最後の世代であるということである。その意味で、その直後の、親も子も戦後教育しか知らない世代と区別したのである。ただ、親の年には幅があるので、下限を４０歳前後とした。
この世代に、安倍総理を含む、今後の日本を背負う人々が多くいる。
ちなみに、ドイツのメルケル首相は安倍総理と同い年、サルコジ大統領は、一歳下である。ヨーロッパでも、いわゆる六八年世代が、大学で、ベトナム反戦、反ド・ゴールに荒れ狂ったが、その終息後の新しい世代であり、より保守的、親米的である。
その次は４０歳前後から２０代半ばまで、人口動態で言う団塊第二世代を含む世代であり、親も子も戦前教育から断絶した世代として、試みに戦後教育第二世代と呼ぶ。他方戦後の偏向教育もそろそろ衰退の過程にあった時代に育ち、学校により教室によりバラつきがあり、個人の差が大きい。
生まれは１９６０年代後半から７０年代であるが、７０年生まれ以降は自虐史観絶頂期の１９８５～２０００年の頃に中高教育を受けている。またその期間はまさにバブル絶頂の時代であり、全世代が、バブル時代の物質的享楽の経験がある。誰もが楽観的で、金があろうと無かろうと、週末ごとに家族旅行などを楽しんだ時代だという。
親も子も戦前教育から断絶し、しかも物質的享楽を得た時代であり、学校でも、人格よりも能力が重んじられる風潮があったと聞く。まさにホリエモンの時代である。
ただ、戦後教育第一世代は、戦後思想で固まっているが、この第二世代となると、話すと「ああ、そうか」と考え直す柔軟性があると言う。
その中でも、さらに、１９７０年生まれを境として、大学卒業、就職時にバブル期だったか、日本が自信を失ったバブル崩壊後だったかの二つの世代に分かれる。
その後は、２０代前半以下である。左翼史観、自虐史観の全面的な衰退期に教育を受け、大学卒業時に経済回復期に巡り合った新しい世代である。日本という国の良さも論じられる時代になった。国家の品格といい、美しい国というのもその余裕の表れである。もはや高度成長やバブルで浮ついていない一方、日本という国家、民族について自信を回復した新しい世代と考えて、将来に期待したい。
ただ、そのまた下２０歳以下には、ゆとり教育で薄っぺらな教科書で育った世代があり、その知識、能力には問題があるという。ゆとり教育も戦後左翼思想の影響である。いつまで戦後が続くのであろうか、もうこれで終止符を打って欲しいと思う。
以上全くの試論であるが、これをもう少し精緻（せいち）に仕上げれば、政治動向分析にも使えるかもしれない。
一例として、今の世論調査分析は１０年ごとに区切っていて、世代論による区分ではないが、それでも、戦前教育第二世代頃の年代の投票傾向は、その前と後の世代より保守的であったことを示す調査結果もあるらしい。
◇岡崎久彦氏＝１９３０年、中国大連生まれ。駐米公使、駐サウジアラビア、駐タイ大使などを歴任。現在、岡崎研究所長。
写真＝岡崎久彦氏
