2006年4月アーカイブ

Daily Yomiuri, April 23, 2006

It seems to be about time to ponder a new national security strategy. Strategy during the Cold War was centered around the theory of mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and Soviet Union that subordinated conventional military strategies under the notion of so-called flexible response. The mutually assured destruction (MAD) theory, however, was never tested and was further obscured by the introduction of former U.S. President Ronald Reagan's idea of missile defense, advanced toward the end of the Cold War.

After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, a "New War" against terrorism was much talked about.

I have dared to distance myself from such debates. I knew these debates were the primary concern of the United States--Japan's indispensable ally--and that we should fully cooperate with Washington. But I was not certain the New War required new military strategic thinking--apart from a grand idea, such as the preemptive use of force.

In fact, I have often given advice to young scholars going to study at U.S. research institutes, not to spend much time on the so-called new warfare issues, but instead, to take studies centering on the future power balance in East Asia, particularly concerning the emergence of China.

I have become increasingly conscious of China's military capability. Looking back, I found that, every one or two years, when matters relating to China's military might were drawn to my attention, I noticed the nation had spectacularly augmented its potential to wage war.

There have been quite a few precedents of rapid change of military balance that eventually changed the course of history.

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Military buildup and war

Following the 1840-42 Opium War, China's Qing dynasty was awakened to the reality that rulers around the world were set on building empires. The Qing emperor rapidly reinforced his nation's military strength to the extent that it came to be regarded by Western powers as a sleeping lion. This became particularly true when China embarked on a large-scale warship-building project in the 1880s--it built a huge navy, spearheaded by two giant battleships, the Digyuan (Ting Yuan) and Dheyuan (Chen Yuan).

Japan felt the threat of China when it was repeatedly overwhelmed by the Qing's military superiority on the Korean Peninsula in incidents in the 1880s, and this nation could not help but be brought to its knees when subject to a show of strength by the Qing's Beiyang (North Sea) fleet on the occasion of its 1886 visit to Nagasaki.

The profound anxiety many Japanese felt at that time about the nation's security can be seen vividly in commentaries written by thinker Yukichi Fukuzawa.

Japan, in a bid to cope with the menace posed by the Qing, began bolstering its Imperial Navy from about 1890.

Hearing of Japan's naval buildup prior to the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, Li Hongzhang, chief minister of the Qing government, was seriously alarmed.

"Our country has failed to add even a single vessel to the Beiyang Navy
since its inauguration in 1888," Li said. "Japan, by contrast, though it, of
course, is nothing but a very tiny country, has devoted itself to building
big battleships year after year by means of adroitly economizing on
government expenditure. The Qing government should urgently increase its
warships."

However, Li's proposal to build more ships never materialized, because the Qing government instead squandered money on celebrations to mark the 60th birthday of Xi Haihou, the empress dowager.

The failure to beef up the Qing's naval force led to its defeat to Japan in the 1894 Battle of the Yalu, and it led, eventually, to the downfall of the Qing dynasty on one hand and to the rise of Imperial Japan on the other.

The classic example can be found in debates that surged from about 1907 among Britain's political and military leaders over the menace posed by Germany due to its warship-construction program that began in 1897. This rivalry culminated in the outbreak of World War I.

Decades later, in the 1970s, the Soviets--keen to vent their decade-old anger against the United States over the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis--launched massive armament projects on the strength of funds it had obtained thanks to two rounds of sharp rises in crude oil prices during the 1970s.

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union loomed as a threat when it caught up with--and even threatened to surpass--the United States in terms of its number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and tonnage of naval fleet vessels.

In the 1970s, however, Washington, its focus blurred by a misty-eyed detente policy, failed to address the menace of the Soviet Union. Stunned by the 1979 Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, the United States embarked on a full-fledged military buildup while calling on its Western allies to beef up their respective military strengths.

Allies of the United States complied with Washington's request. Following the military buildup carried out during the 1980s, the Self-Defense Forces were so advanced and of such a high quality it was singled out for praise as a "hidden success story" by Jim Auer, former chief of the Japan desk at the Pentagon. Indeed, the Japanese helped the power balance in the Far East reverse in favor of the West and bring triumph to the West in the Cold War, at least in Asia.

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Perils from East China Sea

It seems the situation currently unfolding in East Asia is gradually becoming analogous to these historic precedents.

Threats directly affecting Japan's security are those relating to the balance of military power in the East China Sea.

As things stand, the situation is sort of stable at this moment.

This is because although Beijing has currently been behaving audaciously, as if having a colossal naval force behind it, its real might has remained
feeble. Japan, on the other hand, despite its maritime and air forces being overwhelmingly superior to China's, has been abiding to a strictly pacifist, defensive security policy.

There can be no telling, however, what could happen if the military capabilities of the two narrow.

Regarding affairs related to marine resources, Japan has taken the position that a "median line" should demarcate the exclusive economic zones of the two countries. China, for its part, challenges Japan's position, claiming all resources in the seabed are its own as long as they are on the continental shelf that extends from the mainland of China through waters close to Okinawa Prefecture.

The Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea do, in fact, sit on the continental shelf. As the islands are effectively controlled by Japan as its territory, however, it is indisputable that the median line should lie on the continental shelf.

However, given the islands are uninhabited and China has claimed them, there can be no knowing if and when China will attempt to exercise control over them. Beijing could do anything to gain control of the islands, should the command of the sea and air around them be shifted to China.

As for command of the air, Japan has 200 F-15 Eagle fighters, and their pilots are superbly trained.

Of China's fighters, those with comparable capabilities to the F-15s are the Sukhoi Su-27s and Su-30s.

China began introducing these fighters about a decade ago, when they had 20 to 30 of them. Currently, however, the number of the fighters is close to 200.

Nevertheless, the servicing of the fighters and the quality of pilot training are both considered to be of low quality, so they are still far from being a match for the SDF.

However, in the future, there will certainly be improvements in terms of both of the number and performance of China's Sukhoi fighters and its air-combat capability will, sooner or later, catch up with Japan's.

In the 1980s, Japan's endeavors to modernize its military were remarkable. However, Japan has yet to take any measures to counter China's rapid arms buildup.

The situation we face is just like the one Li Hongzhang, the chief minister of the Qing dynasty in the late 19th century, lamented when he spoke of his nation's failure to "add even a single vessel to the Beiyang Navy" since its inception.

Even more problematic is the fact the government, at the suggestion of the Finance Ministry, made a decision last year to cut back on the number of SDF aircraft and vessels.

Threats facing Japan will grow if China increases its armaments. Likewise, the menace posed to this country also increases when our might is slashed. This is tantamount to Japan creating new threats by its own hand.

We have no time to waste in making the nation's military expenditure immune from budgetary cutbacks. In particular, expenditure on aircraft and naval vessels necessary to patrol the East China Sea, as well as missile defense outlays made in response to China's missile deployments must be protected.

The current international military balance requires it.

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Japan-U.S. alliance all-important

Another problem is that of nuclear weapons.

Evidently, the pace of China's military buildup, propelled by two-digit percentage point increases of its budget, year-on-year for 18 consecutive years, is extraordinary.

Had China's military expenditure focused totally on bolstering naval and air forces in the East China Sea, it would have found it quite easy to tilt the military balance in its favor and even to acquire a carrier task force.

Despite the dearth of transparency of information regarding China's military spending, it might be reasonable to surmise that a large chunk of its military budget has been spent on developing nuclear arms and missiles.

Especially noteworthy in this connection is that China's defense spending began to soar in 1997, accompanied by a cut of half a million army personnel in the same year.

In the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, China threatened a nuclear strike on the West Coast of the United States. Presumably, that was nothing but a bluff.

China today must be making a concerted effort to make what it threatened during that crisis a real possibility.

A new mode of thinking is also needed regarding nuclear strategies. Not only China but also Russia have been eager to maintain their post-Cold War nuclear deterrents. Moscow recently announced plans to develop mobile SS-27 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In this age when India and Pakistan seem to have been given de facto permission to have nuclear arms, and while no effective means are to be found to prevent Iran and North Korea from going nuclear, what kind of nuclear strategy, especially for Japan, should be worked out? I cannot discuss this here because of space limitations, and I would like to take it up on another occasion.

If asked to state my conclusion first, however, it is that all that is needed for Japan's strategy is to strengthen its alliance with the United States.

That is, Japan-U.S. relations must be recast anew, to give more potency to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's statement that an attack on Japan would be regarded as an attack on the United States.

To make this statement a reality, the Japan-U.S. relationship must be raised to the level of the British-U.S. relationship by, above all, declaring Japan's decision to exercise its right of collective self-defense, as pointed out in the 2000 Armitage Report.

For Japan, an alliance with the United States is indispensable. Efforts should be redoubled on the part of Tokyo to forge strong links with Washington to make the Japan-U.S. alliance indispensable in the eyes of the United States as well.

When the alliance with Japan across the Pacific is just as essential for the United States as its alliance with Britain across the Atlantic in its dealings with the Eurasian continent we will have achieved a great deal to ensure world peace, as well as to strengthen Japanese and U.S. diplomacy.

【地球を読む】対中戦略　「建艦費」削減の教訓
2006年4月23日 読売新聞朝刊掲載

　そろそろ新しい戦略論を考えねばならない時期が来たようである。冷戦時代咲き競った戦略論、とくに核を中心とする戦略論は、実証の機会も与えられず、また、冷戦の末期にスター・ウォーズ計画などが出て来て、結論が混迷したままである。

　９・１１以降は、対テロ戦略論が盛んとなった。私は、敢（あ）えて、この議論からは遠ざかっていた。米国の研究所に赴く若い人に言ったのを覚えている。「いわゆる『新しい戦争』などにあまり時間を使うなよ。中国との軍事バランスを中心に勉強しろよ」と。

　その頃（ころ）から中国が最大の問題になるであろうという問題意識はあり、時々気にはなっていた。しかし、思い返してみると、問題は、それが１、２年の間隔を置いて意識に上るごとに、中国の力がその都度目を見張るほど増大しているということである。

　歴史上そういう時期は時々ある。清国は、アヘン戦争以来衰退を続けたのではない。帝国主義時代の世界の趨勢（すうせい）に目覚めて、態勢を立て直し、眠れる獅子と言われた時代もあった。とくに大建艦計画に乗り出し、定遠、鎮遠を擁する大海軍を建設した。日本がその脅威を感じたのは、１８８０年代前半の朝鮮半島での勢力争いで相次いで清国に敗れ、北洋艦隊の長崎訪問で清国の威勢の前に膝（ひざ）を屈したときであり、その危機感は、その当時の福沢諭吉の評論に如実に見ることができる。

　日本はそれに対抗して１８９０年ごろから急速に海軍を充実させた。日清戦争直前、李鴻章は「清国は８８年の北洋海軍創設以降一艦も加えず、日本はサイ爾（さいじ）たる小邦なれども、猶能（なおよ）く経費を節約して、毎年巨艦を増加す」と警鐘を鳴らし、追加建艦の必要を指摘した。しかし、それは西太后の還暦の祝いの経費のため実現せず、黄海海戦の敗北、ひいては、大清帝国の衰退、大日本帝国の勃興（ぼっこう）をもたらすことになる。

　古典的な例としては１８９７年以来のドイツの建艦計画が１０年ほど経過した頃、英国で盛んに論じられたドイツ脅威論があるが、これはそのまま大戦につながっている。近い例では、キューバ危機の屈辱以来遺恨十年一剣を磨いてきたソ連が、１９７０年代の二度の油価高騰の資金で大軍拡に乗り出し、大陸間弾道弾（ＩＣＢＭ）の基数、海軍のトン数などで米国に追いつき追い越す状況となった８０年代初頭のソ連の脅威時代がある。

　デタントぼけでこれに注意を払わなかった米国は、ソ連のアフガン侵入で愕然（がくぜん）として、自らも抜本的に軍備を増強するとともに、西側同盟諸国に軍備強化を呼びかけ、各国もこれに応じた。とくに８０年代の日本の増強はジム・アワー（元米国防総省日本部長）が「隠れた成功物語」と言ったほどであり、極東の軍事バランスを逆転させ、少なくともアジアにおける冷戦の勝利を決定づけた。

　◆核戦略にも新時代の思考を　

　東アジアの情勢も、だんだんとこういう歴史的な先例に近づきつつあるように思う。

　日本にとって身近な脅威は東シナ海のバランスである。

　現在はバランスが保たれている。それは、中国はあたかも背後に大海軍があるがごとく傍若無人に振る舞っているが、実際の力は微弱であり、これに対し、海空軍戦力に圧倒的な優位を持つ日本が平和主義、専守防衛だからである。

　しかし彼我の力の差が狭まってくるとどうなるかわからない。日本の主張している線は両国の中間線であるが、中国は中国大陸から沖縄のそばまで延びている大陸棚の資源は中国のものだと言っている。

　尖閣諸島はその大陸棚の上に乗っている。これは日本が実効支配している日本領土であるから、大陸棚の上も中国大陸との中間線で良いわけである。しかし中国も領土権を主張し、無人島でもあるので、何時中国が実効支配を企図するかわからない。制空権制海権が中国側に移れば後は何でも出来る。

　制空権について言えば、日本は、高度に訓練されたＦ１５を２００機持っている。中国側でこれに対抗できる性能の機種は、スホイ２７、３０である。ほんの１０年前には２０、３０機導入されたばかりであったのが、いまは２００機になんなんとしている。ただその整備や、パイロットの錬度が低いのでまだとうてい自衛隊の敵ではない。しかし、数も性能も年ごとに向上するので、いずれは日本に追いついて来る。

　日本の軍事力は、先に述べたように８０年代中心に営々として築いてきたものであるが、その後は中国の飛躍的増強に対してまだ対抗措置をとっていない。

　まさに、「以降一艦も加えず」と李鴻章が憂慮したような事態と言える。それどころではない。昨年は財務省の主張で航空機と艦船の削減まで決まったという。中国が軍備を増強すれば脅威は増大する。同じように日本側が削減しても脅威は増大する。自分の手で自分に対する脅威を増大させているのである。

　もうそろそろ、軍事費、特に東シナ海で必要な航空機、艦船、それから中国のミサイルに対するミサイル防衛費などは予算の聖域となるべきであろう。国際軍事バランスがそうさせている。

　もう一つの問題は核である。１８年間２桁（けた）増という中国の軍拡はたしかに異常である。もしその資金を東シナ海の海空軍力増強中心に使っていたならば、日中バランスの逆転はおろか空母機動部隊も持てた額である。透明性が無いのでわからないが、その相当部分は核とミサイル開発に向けられている、というのが妥当な推理であろう。

　特に中国防衛費の急増が１９９７年から始まっていることは注目すべきである。９６年の台湾海峡危機のとき、中国側は、アメリカの西海岸に核を撃ち込むと脅したが、それは明らかに、虚勢であった。それを現実の力としようとしていることは容易に想像し得る。

　核戦略についても新思考が必要である。中国だけでなく、ロシアも新しい移動式ＳＳ２７の開発を発表し、今でも戦略核能力の維持におさおさ怠りない。印パの核は黙認、北朝鮮とイランの核は抑制困難と言うような新しい時代の核戦略、特に日本の核戦略については、ここでは紙数がないので、稿を改めて論じたい。

　ただ結論だけを先に言ってしまえば、それは日米同盟の強化につきる。

　つまり「日本に対する攻撃は米国に対する攻撃とみなす」というアーミテージ発言を実効的なものとするような日米関係を作り上げねばならない。

　そのためには、まさにアーミテージ報告の主張するように、集団的自衛権の行使を認めて、日米関係を米英関係に近いものにして、アメリカにとって、日米同盟は、その外交上あるいはその生存上、不可欠なものとさせる努力が必要である。